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Expert opinion at trial is an exception in the law of evidence. The unique role of the 
testimonial expert, together with the fact that the expert is permitted to give opinion 
evidence where normally opinions are inadmissible, in part explain the steady 
expansion of disclosure over privilege in civil litigation.
The de facto incorporation of the expert into the fact-finding function o f the 
court in areas where the court, unaided, is not capable of drawing the proper 
inferences from raw data or factual evidence, calls for caution in the judicial 
treatment of expert evidence. The willingness of judges to countenance an intrusion 
into otherwise privileged territory is more readily understandable considering that, in 
effect and to a significant degree, the court delegates a judicial function to experts. 
The court must, accordingly, be satisfied that the experts -  whose opinions are to be 
adopted -  are beyond reproach.1
The expert witness offering his opinion to the court is expected to shed his 
partisan affiliations. The court expects of him to offer impartial and objective 
assessments of raw evidence that is not possible to understand without the 
unrefracted lense of the expert’s special expertise. While, in an adversarial system -  
where experts are called and remunerated by parties to proceedings having an 
interest in the ultimate disposition of those proceedings -  this objectivity may appear 
to be a legal fiction, it is nevertheless the main premise upon which experts are 
permitted to give their opinions and upon which expert evidence that is trusted is
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received.2 Indeed, where the court perceives that the expert has adopted the role of 
an advocate, the expert’s opinion will either be ruled inadmissible or accorded little 
or no weight.3
Judicial cynicism towards the objectivity and reliability of experts’ opinions 
and reports is increasingly prevalent.4 Although counsel must work closely with any 
necessary expert to present a coherent and carefully elaborated opinion, the close 
relationship that often develops between lawyer and expert raises concerns of bias 
and fairness.5
Canadian trial judges increasingly take a dim view of experts’ “opinions” as 
being nothing more than the by-products of mercenary work. An apparently 
qualified expert will say one thing, while another similarly-qualified expert in the 
same field will say the opposite. “The impression that he who pays the piper calls 
the tune is sometimes inescapable.”6 Witnesses-for-sale or hired-guns are not 
welcome in court since experts are expected to be neutral.7 Their testimony is meant 
to assist the court and the trier of fact, not to bolster the theory of the case presented 
by one of the two sides.8
Would our systems of civil litigation function more fairly and effectively if 
production of all written communications between counsel and expert were
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Law Book, 1997) at 21.
6 O ’Neill v. Campbell et al. (1995), 161 N.B.R. (2d) 1 (Q.B.), Creaghan, J .
7 Thomas Woods, ‘“Impartial Expert or Hired Gun?’ Recent Developments at Home and Abroad” 
(2002), online: Lawson Lundell <http://www.lawsonlundell.com>.
8 Browne, supra note 4 at 62-63.
mandatory?9 Would inefficiency and unfairness result if litigation privilege was not 
available?10 Courts are at loggerheads on this issue, which includes whether 
production of instructing letters of counsel and expert preliminary reports should be 
protected by litigation privilege.
The law is in a state of flux on this narrow aspect of Canadian civil litigation 
and even the legal reasoning of the Supreme Court of Canada is still a work in 
progress.11
1. Clash of Titans: The Common Law in Motion
Competing legal theories are at play both at discovery and trial. Issues of production 
come at the forefront of litigation initially at discovery or afterwards at trial. In 
either case, there is a clash of conflicting values between the contradictory policy 
objectives of encouraging broad disclosure in litigation and protecting litigation 
privilege. In all cases, the issues at stake are a function of the civil process of dispute 
adjudication.
Adversarial proceedings are traditionally the hallmark of the system of 
adjudication of dispute in common law jurisdictions. Every jurisdiction throughout 
the Canadian federation has inherited this typical English system of civil justice with 
the notable exception of the Province of Québec.
One feature of modem Canadian systems of civil justice has been the perpetual 
dynamic tension between disclosure and privilege. Why?
Under modern-day rules of discovery, it is accepted as an article of faith that 
generous disclosure of documents and information is the underpinning of fairness in 
the adjudicative process. The ever-expanding scope of disclosure has been 
tempered, however, by the assertion of privilege for both solicitor-client privilege 
and litigation privilege, which are at the forefront of the adversarial setting.
Solicitor-client privilege has been given full status as a substantive legal right 
that can be exerted outside the scope of adversarial proceedings.12 However, 
litigation privilege has been steadily eroded under the unrelenting pressure of 
modern-day rules of disclosure in Canadian civil proceedings. Nowhere has this 
been more obvious than in the area concerning access to expert work product. These
9 Morrissey v. M orrissey (2000), 196 D.L.R. (4th) 94 at para 37 (Nfld. C.A.) [M orrissey].
10 Turner (Litigation Guardian of) v. Dyck, [2002] O.J. No. 4775 at para. 17 (S.C.) [Turner]. Claims of 
litigation privilege require the determination o f questions o f mixed law and fact rather than the 
exercise of discretion: Torchia v. Royal Insurance Co. o f  Canada (2000), 20 C.C.L.I. (3d) 229 (Ont. 
S.C.J.).
11 Blank v. Canada (Department o f  Justice), [2006] 2 S.C.R. 319 [Blank].
12 Andrew Moran, Q.C., “Legal Professional Privilege - Know the Boundaries and Keep the Privilege” at 
para. 6, online: Byrom Street Chambers Symposium 2004 <http://www.byromstreet.com>.
privileges therefore provide unequal protection against mandatory compelled 
disclosure.13
(A) Movements o f the Tectonic Plates o f Common Law: Top Courts on the Move
Recently, the highest courts in Canada and England considered litigation privilege 
and solicitor-client or legal advice privilege. In 2004, the House of Lords in Three 
Rivers District Council v. Governor and Company of the Bank of England14, , 
significantly widened the scope of the solicitor-client privilege, but left critical issues 
to be resolved in the future. In Blank v. Canada (Minister of Justice)15 the Supreme 
Court of Canada dealt with, for the first time, the issue of litigation privilege.
A factual review of the circumstances of these cases is necessary, since at 
common law, legal principles are advanced incrementally on the facts of particular 
cases rather than in a factual vacuum.16
In Three Rivers, the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Bank of England 
(“Bank”) had set up an inquiry into the collapse of a secondary bank (“BCCI”). It 
was clear from the outset that the inquiry might criticize the Bank’s conduct and 
affairs with BCCI and would likely lead to legal proceedings against the Bank by 
creditors of BCCI and others who had lost money in consequence of BCCI’s 
collapse.
The Bank agreed to make submissions to the inquiry with respect to the 
collapse. A number of its employees and ex-employees agreed to give evidence to 
the inquiry. The Bank set up a small group of employees as an inquiry unit (“BIU”) 
specifically for the purpose of liasing with external lawyers in relation to the inquiry. 
Freshfields, the Bank’s solicitors, were instructed to assist the Bank with advice on 
both the preparation and presentation of the submissions and further on evidence to 
be given to the inquiry by employees and ex-employees of the Bank.
Certain employees and ex-employees of the Bank, some who were members of 
the BIU, prepared documents with the intention of sending them to Freshfields to aid 
its task of advising on the submissions and the evidence. Subsequent to the creation 
of these documents, various external parties sued the Bank for misfeasance in public
13 Anne-Marie Sheahan, “The Litigation and Legal Advice Privileges: Unequal Exceptions to Mandatory 
Disclosure”, online: <http://www.mcarthy.ca>.
14 Three Rivers District Council v. Governor and Company o f  the Bank o f England,[2004] U.K.H.L. 48 
(H.L.) [Three Rivers].
15 Blank, supra note 11. See also Lyette Doré, and Arslanian, Chahé-Phillipe, « Grandeur et misères des 
privilèges liés au secret professionnel de l’avocat : les arrêts Goodis et Blank en Cour Suprême! »
(2006) 8 Revue de la common law en français 353.
16 Krouse v. Chrysler Canada Ltd., [1970] 3 O.R. 135 at 136 (H.C.); R.D. Belanger & Associates Ltd. v. 
Stadium Corp. o f Ontario Ltd. (1991), 5 O.R. (3rd) 778 at 782; Halton Hills (Town) v. Kerouac (2006), 
270 D.L.R. (4th) 479 (Ont. S.C.).
office with respect to the collapse of BCCI. In the course of that litigation, the 
appellants sought disclosure and inspection of all documents including the 
Freshfields documents.
In the context of English law, the inquiry did not constitute adversarial 
litigation. Hence, the documents could not be subject to litigation privilege. 
However, the Bank contended that the documents were shielded from disclosure on 
account of legal advice privilege (i.e. solicitor-client privilege).
The Bank decided to forego a claim to litigation privilege based on the fact that, 
although it contemplated litigation at the time of the inquiry, the dominant purpose 
for which documents were produced was not for possible future litigation, but for 
presentation of submissions and evidence to the inquiry itself. The inquiry did not 
constitute an adversarial proceeding and, in contrast to court proceedings, it was a 
fact-finding process. The Bank therefore sought to rely on legal advice privilege to 
shield the documents created both by members of the BIU and those documents 
prepared by other employees. The issue before the court was therefore the scope of 
the legal advice privilege.
The House o f Lords dealt only with this issue on appeal; although the Court of 
Appeal of England had also issued a restrictive definition of “who is the client” for 
the purpose of receiving that advice. The appeal before the House o f Lords dealt 
strictly with the scope of legal advice and not with the issue of who is the lawyer’s 
client in the context of a large organization. It follows that guidance from the House 
of Lords as to the issue of “who is the client” remains to be obtained.
This factual background led to five different sets of concurring reasons issued 
by the panel of the House of Lords:
(a) The Court noted the close proximity between legal advice privilege and 
litigation privilege, and then set out the broad scope of the legal advice 
privilege.
(b) The Court held that legal advice is not confined to telling the client the 
law; it must include advice as to what should prudently and sensibly be 
done in the relevant legal context. Legal advice, which would attract 
privilege, was defined to include that which related to the rights, 
liabilities, obligations, or remedies of the client.
(c) The modem lawyer does not simply give black and white advice on the 
construction of legal principles. Legal advice now extends to practical 
advice such as the protection of the client’s reputation, provided such 
advice arises out of a given legal context.
(d) However, the traditional business solicitor may find himself exceeding 
the boundaries of legal advice privilege if he advises a client on all 
business matters, including in relation to investments and finances 
outside a legal context.
(e) The advice given to a client concerning the evidence he will give at an 
inquiry or an inquest does attract legal advice privilege. It will not 
attract the other type of legal professional privilege, litigation privilege, 
since the proceedings are not adversarial. This is described as 
presentational advice.
(f) In general, it does not matter that litigation may not ultimately result 
from the inquiry or inquest -  the defence of personal reputation and 
integrity is also important.
(g) Furthermore, Lord Scott, specifically referred to concerns about 
planning inquiries. Accordingly, advice given by lawyers to a developer 
in relation to his rights under planning laws and to objectors to a 
proposed development would also come under legal advice privilege 
and thus be shielded from compellable disclosure.
Several issues in relation to the scope of the legal professional or legal advice 
privilege, which protects communications between solicitor and client irrespective of 
pending or anticipated litigation, have remained unanswered by the House of Lords. 
These issues typically arise when privileged documents are disclosed by a company 
to its auditors or in the course of a regulatory investigation. The decision of the 
House of Lords in Three Rivers provides the basis for an argument that the courts 
ought to adopt a liberal view of legal advice privilege and to extend the protection of 
privilege to a wide range of documents prepared by in-house counsel.17
One issue unanswered by the House of Lords relates to who would be the client 
in a situation similar to the factual background of Three Rivers. The Court of Appeal 
had held that the clients for privilege purposes were only the members of the BIU. 
Communication between any other employee of the Bank, even the Governor of the 
Bank and its lawyer, did not attract legal advice privilege. Consequently, the Court 
of Appeal had held that no privilege could be claimed over documents prepared by 
other employees and ex-employees of the Bank and sent to Freshfields. Thus, “who 
is the client” has been defined restrictively.
Therefore, great care needs to be taken over the creation of internal documents 
in a large organization concerning an issue that may ultimately lead to litigation. 
The free use of e-mail, for example, both internally for discussion and externally 
with lawyers and third parties is also potentially dangerous. Caution ought to rule 
the day until such time as the issue is resolved.18
In the footsteps of the House of Lords’ judgement, the Supreme Court of 
Canada entered the fray and for the first time; they dealt with the nature, scope, and 
duration of litigation privilege and its difference from another exemption from
17 Neil Guthrie, “Recent Developments in the Law of Privilege” (2006) 31 Advoc. Q. 23.
18 Miranda Whiteley, “Privilege and Three Rivers (No. 6)” (11 November 2004), online: 
<http://www.mills-reeve.com>.
compelled disclosure: solicitor-client privilege. In doing so, it clarified many areas 
of the law relating to litigation privilege and prepared the groundwork for future 
issues.
In Blank, the Crown had laid 13 charges against the respondent and a company 
for regulatory offences. Those charges were quashed and new charges laid by the 
Crown were subsequently stayed prior to trial. The respondent sued the federal 
government and sought damages for abuse of its prosecutorial powers among other 
grounds.
In that civil action, the respondent sought disclosure of all records relating to 
the criminal prosecution under the Federal Access to Information Act (the Acf). 19The 
request was denied on various grounds including solicitor-client privilege under 
Section 23 of the Act. Certain documents were released to the respondent after he 
lodged a complaint with the Information Commissioner while other documents were 
found to be properly exempted. The respondent was successful in judicial review 
under Section 41 of the Act and the requested documents were to be released 
provided the litigation to which they related had ended. The Federal Court of Appeal 
upheld that decision and the matter went to the Supreme Court of Canada.
Blank is essential reading for all litigators. In what respect does the 
contribution of the Supreme Court of Canada constitute much needed -  and 
anticipated -  guidance? A review of the conflicting case law is needed to answer 
this question.
(B) Regulatory Framework
In Ontario, the Rules of Civil Procedure20 provides the regulatory framework. 
Rule 31.06(3) mandates disclosure of findings, opinions, and conclusions of an 
expert at the discovery stage:
31.06(3) A party may, on an examination for discovery, obtain disclosure 
of findings, opinions, and conclusions of an expert engaged by or on 
behalf o f the party being examined that relate to a matter in issue in the 
action and of the expert’s name and address, but the party being examined 
need not disclose the information or the name and address of the expert 
where,
(a) the findings, opinions, and conclusions of the 
expert relating to any matter in issue in the action were 
made or formed in preparation for contemplated or 
pending litigation and for no other purpose; and
(b) the party being examined undertakes not to call the 
expert as a witness at the trial.21
19 Federal Access to Information Act, R.S.C. 1985, C. A -l.
20 Rules O f Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194.
Rules similar to Ontario’s 31.06(3) can be found in varying shades in all Canadian 
jurisdictions. Typically, rules of court at the discovery stage require that counsel 
disclose the existence of expert evidence. However, compliance with the relevant 
rule does not require producing an expert report if an expert is retained. What is 
required, however, is the disclosure of expert evidence relied on (that is the findings, 
opinions, and conclusions) of any expert to be called at trial that relates to a matter in 
issue in the action as well as the expert’s name and address. The disclosure of the 
factual basis of such expert evidence is not restricted to written reports. The rule 
requires the disclosure of any expert’s finding, opinion, or conclusion, expressed in a 
sufficiently coherent manner that it can be used by counsel.22 The rule therefore 
challenges what is now known as the “zone of privacy” protected by litigation 
privilege.
Of course, findings, opinions, and conclusions of the expert made in 
preparation for contemplated or pending litigation and for no other purpose, need not 
be disclosed if the party undertakes not to call the expert as a witness at trial.
On the other hand, Rule 53.03(1) requires a party who intends to call an expert 
witness at trial to serve a signed report that sets out the substance of an expert’s 
proposed testimony no less than 90 days before the trial or they must seek leave of 
the trial judge. The rule provides as follows:
53.03(1) A party who intends to call an expert witness at trial shall, not 
less than 90 days before the commencement of the trial, serve on every 
other party to the action a report, signed by the expert setting his or her 
name, address and qualifications and the substance of his or her proposed 
testimony.23
In other Canadian jurisdictions, the equivalent rule has the common 
requirement of serving a notice setting out the substance of the expert s proposed 
testimony at trial. The difference lies mostly in the timeframe within which the 
notice must be issued.
However, once the expert goes into the witness box at trial, the issue is whether 
privilege is waived on the contents of the expert file including materials received 
from counsel and preliminary reports.
21 Rules O f Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, s.31.
22 David Hooley, “Scope of Examination at Oral Discovery” in T. Archibald and M. Cochrane, eds., 
Annual Review o f Civil Litigation 2002 (Toronto: Carswell, 2002).
23 Rules O f Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194. s.53.
(C) Discoverability and Production
Rules of disclosure in a civil action mandate full, frank and open disclosure during 
the discovery process.24 The goal is to provide parties greater opportunity to settle 
their cases and avoid surprises at trial. Questions posed in an examination for 
discovery must be answered if the questions have a semblance of relevancy to the 
matters at issue, as defined in the pleadings. “Wide latitude” is permitted at 
discovery, which is bound only by the requirement that the information sought 
relates to any matter at issue in the action. Similar principles apply to documentary 
disclosure.25
However, not all cases are settled out of court. Parties must therefore always be 
concerned to protect what has been traditionally known as the barrister’s brief: 
documents, ideas, strategies, and other materials needed to prepare and conduct the 
trial. The challenge both for the bar and the bench is to know where to draw the line 
between disclosure and privilege.
The modem trend in the direction of complete discovery is the direct 
consequence of the historical changes in the way in which litigation, coast to coast, 
has been conducted both through reforms in rules of procedure and case law 
development in the later part of the 20th century.26 In the Common Law world, the 
recognition of the necessity of full disclosure for proper litigation has resulted in a 
shift from the historic ambush model to full disclosure. It is well established that the 
mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is now essential 
to proper litigation.27
(D) Confidentiality and Zone of Privacy
Withholding relevant evidence on account of a claim for privilege is an exception to 
the modem objectives of the administration of civil procedure. These objectives are 
the ascertainment of justice and truth.
Nevertheless, rules of privilege are rooted in both policy and necessity. They 
warrant the protection of interests and relationships, which, rightly or wrongly, are 
regarded as of sufficient social importance to justify some sacrifice of availability of 
evidence relevant to the administration of justice. These interests should be fostered 
because of the civil litigation process itself. The nature of the doctrine of litigation
24 Guelph (City) v. Super Blue Box Recycling Corp. [2004] O.J. No. 4468 at paras. 17-18 (S.C.) 
[Guelph]; see also Chmara v. Nguyen [1993] M.J. No. 274 (Man. C.A.).
25 General Accident Assurance Co. v. Chrusz (1999), 180 D.L.R. (4th) 241 (Ont. C.A.) at para. 25 
[Chrusz].
26 Hickman v. Taylor (1946), 329 U.S. 495.
27 Robert Sharpe, “Claiming Privilege in the Discovery Process”, in Law in Transition: Evidence, 
Special Lectures o f  the Law Society o f  Upper Canada. (Don Mills, Ont.: Richard De Boo Publishers 
1984) at 165.
privilege was set out in an article by R. J. Sharpe28 prior to his judicial appointment, 
which was adopted in the judgement of Carthy, J.A., in General Accident Assurance 
Co. v. Chrusz:29
Relating litigation privilege to the needs of the adversary process is 
necessary to arrive at an understanding of its content and effect. The 
effect of a rule of privilege is to shut out the truth, but the process which 
litigation privilege is aimed to protect -- the adversary process -- among 
other things, attempts to get at the truth. There are, then, competing 
interests to be considered when a claim of litigation privilege is asserted; 
there is a need for a zone of privacy to facilitate adversarial preparation; 
there is also the need for disclosure to foster fair trial.30
As the privilege not to answer certain questions at a trial is, in part, to prevent 
information from being disclosed, it has been logically extended to the discovery 
process of civil litigation. Hence, privileged documents or privileged information 
need not be produced or disclosed during discovery.
(E) Legal Privileges
Generally speaking, legal privilege is a mechanism available to protect confidential 
communications or documents from disclosure. The two main types of legal 
privilege are solicitor-client privilege and litigation privilege.
Litigation privilege is the narrower of the two privileges. Its rationale is to 
protect information to facilitate the adversarial process of investigating and preparing 
a case for trial. Litigation privilege can be limited by other competing interests. In 
considering a claim of litigation privilege, courts must weigh the interest of privacy 
to facilitate adversarial preparation against the competing interest of disclosure to 
foster a fair trial.
Litigation privilege can only arise when communications or documents were 
made for the dominant purpose of reasonably contemplated litigation or existing 
litigation. The dominant-purpose standard had been adopted by appellate courts in 
Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Ontario, Alberta, and British Columbia and has now 
received approval by the Supreme Court of Canada in Blank.
Litigation privilege in the civil litigation context has several features of 
importance:
(a) solicitor-client privilege applies only to confidential communications 
between the client and his solicitor. Litigation privilege, on the other 
hand, applies to communications of a non-confidential nature between
28 Ibid.
29 Chrusz, supra note 25; Sharpe, supra note 27.
30 Chrusz, ibid. at para. 23.
the solicitor and third parties and even includes material of a non- 
communicative nature brought into existence for the dominant purpose 
of litigation;
(b) solicitor-client privilege exists any time a client seeks legal advice from 
his solicitor whether or not litigation is involved. Once in existence, it 
remains forever. Litigation privilege, on the other hand, applies only in 
the context of litigation itself. It ends with the litigation;
(c) litigation privilege developed as an outgrowth of solicitor-client 
privilege to encompass communications between the client or his 
solicitor and third parties if made for the solicitor’s information for the 
purpose of pending or contemplated litigation;
(d) although litigation privilege may trace its origins to traditional solicitor- 
client privilege, the policy justifications for the two differ: solicitor- 
client privilege is based on the need for the protection of a relationship, 
whereas litigation privilege is based on the need for a protected area to 
facilitate investigation and preparation of a case for trial by the 
adversarial advocate. It protects a process;
(e) neither privilege in the civil context affords a privilege against the 
discovery of facts that are or may be relevant to the determination of the 
facts in issue. The facts or documents that happen to be reflected in such 
communications or materials are not privileged from discovery if, 
otherwise, the party would be bound to give discovery of them31 ; and
(f) the rationale for solicitor-client privilege is very different from that 
which underlies litigation privilege.
What are the different rationales at work? The interest that underlies the 
protection of communications between a client and a solicitor from disclosure, is the 
interest of all citizens to have full and ready access to legal advice. It describes the 
privilege that exists between a client and his or her lawyer. In order for the legal 
system to function properly, clients must feel free and protected to be frank and 
candid with their lawyers about their affairs.32 It is a jealously guarded privilege, 
which, once established, is considerably broad and all-encompassing.33
In Descôteaux et al. v. Mierzwinski,34 a unanimous Court formulated a 
substantive rule to apply when communications between solicitor and client are 
likely to be disclosed without the client’s consent. A judge must not interfere with 
the confidentiality of communications between solicitor and client “except to the 
extent absolutely necessary in order to achieve the ends sought by the enabling
31 R .v . Trang, [2002] 6 W.W.R. 524 (Alta. Q.B.) at para. 65.
32 Smith v. Jones, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 455 at para. 46, cited with approval in Pritchard v. Ontario (Human 
Rights Commission,) [2004] 1 S.C.R. 809.
33 Ibid at SIT.
34 Descôteaux et al. v. Mierzwinski, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 860.
legislation”.35 Lavallee, Racket & Heintz v. Canada (Attorney General),36 further 
emphasized the fundamental nature of the substantive rule. It is, therefore, 
incumbent on a judge to apply the “absolutely necessary” test when deciding and 
applying for disclosure of such records.
This strict approach prevailed in R. v. McClure, where Major J. stated:
However, solicitor-client privilege must be as close to absolute as 
possible to ensure public confidence and retain relevance. As such, it will 
only yield in certain clearly defined circumstances, and does not involve a 
balancing of interest on a case-by-case basis.37
So powerful is the solicitor-client privilege that the question of disclosure of 
solicitor-client privileged communications does not involve a balancing of interests 
on a case-by-case basis. Indeed, absolute necessity is as restrictive a test as may be 
formulated short of an absolute prohibition in every case.38
Litigation privilege, on the other hand, is geared directly to the process of 
litigation. Its purpose is more particularly related to the needs of the adversarial trial 
process. Litigation privilege is based on the need of the adversarial advocate for a 
protected area to facilitate investigation and preparation of a case for trial.39 It has 
been defined as a practical means of assuring a zone of privacy to solicitors.40 
Litigation privilege is essentially a creature of adversarial proceedings.41
Litigation privilege has been referred to as the “lawyer’s work-product” in the 
American jurisprudence. However, this description has not found widespread 
acceptance in Canada.42
Prevailing academic wisdom has held that the first privilege does not 
encompass the second.43 They are separate and distinct. At first blush, these 
differences are clearly articulated and the need to distinguish between the two seems 
to have been judicially accepted. They are nevertheless interrelated.
35 Ibid.
36 Lavallee, Racket & Heintz v. Canada (Attorney General), [2002] 3 S.C.R. 209; Sharpe, supra note 27 
at 165.
37 R. v. McClure, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 445 at para. 35 [McClure].
38 Goodis v. Ontario (Ministry o f  Correctional Services), [2006] 2 S.C.R. 32.
39 Descôteaux et al. v. Mierzwinski, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 860.
40 Lavallee, Rackel & Heintz v. Canada (Attorney General), [2002] 3 S.C.R. 209.
41 McClure, supra note 37.
42 Sharpe, supra note 27 at 165; In Re L (A Minor), [1997] A.C. 16 (H.L.).
43 Blank, supra note 11.
(F) Confusion Above, Pandemonium Below: Appeal Courts at Odds
There has been disagreement from the outset whether there is actually any difference 
between solicitor-client privilege and litigation privilege. In Hodgkinson v. Simms44 
the British Columbia Court of Appeal held:
It appears to me that, while this privilege is usually subdivided for the 
purpose of explanation into two species, namely:
(a) confidential communications with a client; and
(b) the contents of the solicitor’s brief,
it is really one all-embracing privilege that permits the client to speak in 
confidence to the solicitor, for the solicitor to undertake such enquiries and 
collect such material as he may require to properly advise the client, and 
for the solicitor to furnish legal services, all free from any prying or 
dipping into this most confidential relationship by opposing interests or 
anyone.45
In contrast, the Ontario Court of Appeal, in Chrusz, held the opposite thesis in 
recognizing two separate privileges. Other appellate courts have found the same. 
For example, in 1996, the Alberta Court of Appeal held that “the solicitor-client 
privilege and litigation privilege are distinct, and should not be confused.”46
In New Brunswick, the Court of Appeal held in Lamey (Litigation Guardian of) 
v. Rice that communications between counsel and a third party are privileged under 
solicitor-client privilege rather than litigation privilege on the basis of agency. What 
makes this case interesting is that it did not mention Chrusz, which held that an 
adjuster was not an agent of the insurer’s solicitor, and that accordingly, solicitor- 
client privilege would not protect his reports from disclosure. In Chrusz, the Ontario 
Court of Appeal held that if there were to be protection, it would have to be 
considered under litigation privilege rather than solicitor-client privilege. The New 
Brunswick Court of Appeal, in Lamey, held that the adjuster carrying out an 
investigation was acting as an agent of the client at the direction of the client’s 
lawyer and as a result, produced documents to assist the lawyer in advising the client. 
The Court concluded that the file was therefore protected by solicitor-client privilege 
because of the agency relationship. This conclusion only adds to the analytical 
confusion of the issues.
The inconsistent approaches by the various courts of appeal in Canada and the 
resulting confusion have had a substantial impact on trial judges dealing with issues
44 Hodgkinson v. Simms (1988), 55 D.L.R. (4th) 577 (B.C.C.A.) [Hodgkinson].
45 Ibid. at para.24.
46 Moseley v. Spray Lakes Sawmills (1980) Ltd. (1996), 39 Alta. L.R. (3d) 141 (C.A.), at para. 18 
[Moseley],
47 Lamey (Litigation Guardian of) v. Rice, [2000] N.B.J. No. 271 (C.A.).
of production. Lack of appellate review from the Supreme Court of Canada had only 
magnified the problem. Despite the allure that Chrusz may hold, the law in British 
Columbia is settled by the decision of Hodgkinson.48 For example, in British 
Columbia, in Do v. Esmaili,49 Wilson J. noted on the issue of legal privileges that he 
was bound by the prior decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal:
[11] Mr. Do relies on the notion that full and complete disclosure is the 
contemporary norm. He calls in aid a number of decisions of this Court, 
said to import principles in authorities from the province of Ontario. I 
think some caution must be exercised before resorting to Ontario 
procedure. One of the reasons for the principles found in those authorities 
appears to be that the Ontario rules and decisions applying them ‘... are 
based upon the philosophy of complete disclosure between the parties for 
the purposes of trial’. In this jurisdiction the debate has gone the other 
way. In Hodgkinson v. Simms, the Chief Justice, for himself and Taggart,
J.A., wrote:
‘While I have no hesitation associating myself with 
the fullest possible disclosure, it seems to me with 
respect that the cases cited are not authority for the 
proposition that privilege must give way to disclosure.
In fact, the cases cited do not deal with solicitors’ 
privilege at all. There are strong and valid reasons for 
privilege which should not likely be diluted, and 
conflicting policies, even where they collide head on, 
often coexist, with one subject to the other. While I 
favour full disclosure in proper circumstances, it will 
be rare, if ever, that the need for disclosure will 
displace privilege.’50
Hodgkinson has come under heavy criticism from the majority decision in 
Chrusz. CarthyJ. said:
The majority reasons reflect a traditional view of the entitlement to 
privacy in a lawyer’s investigative pursuits. It is an instinctive reflex of 
any litigation counsel to collect evidence and to pounce at the most 
propitious moment. That’s the fun in litigation! But the ground rules are 
changing in favour of early discovery. Litigation counsel must adjust to 
this new environment and I can see no reason to think that clients may 
suffer except by losing the surprise effect of the hidden missile.51
48 Hodgkinson, supra note 44; see also Hoy v. Medtronic, Inc. (2001), 94 B.C.L.R. (3d) 169 (S.C.), at 
para. 53.
49 Do v. Esmaili (2002), 21 C.P.C. (5th) 97 (B.C. S.C.).
50 Ibid. at para. 11, citing Hodgkinson, supra note 44 at para. 19.
51 Chrusz, supra note 25 at para. 37.
The New Brunswick Court of Appeal, in Edgar v. Auld,52 has taken note of 
both approaches and opted in favour of Chrusz rather than Hodgkinson. This 
support, however, is suspect as a result of the path chosen in Lamey.
It is in this murky judicial context that lines have been drawn throughout 
various jurisdictions in Canada between conservative and liberal authorities on the 
companion issues of disclosure of instructing letters from counsel to experts and 
disclosure of experts’ draft reports and working papers.
2. Justice by Osmosis: Mutually Acceptable Influence in Adversarial Settings
The adversarial system is based on the assumption that if each side presents its case 
in the strongest light, the court will be best able to determine the truth. Counsel must 
be free to make the fullest investigation and research without risking disclosure of 
his or her opinions, strategies, and conclusions to opposing counsel.
An invasion of the privacy of counsel’s trial preparation might well lead to the 
postponement of research and other preparation until the eve of, or during the trial, 
so as to avoid early disclosure of harmful information. This result would be counter­
productive to the modem goal that early and thorough investigation by counsel will 
encourage an early settlement of the case. Indeed, if counsel knows the fruits of his 
work must be turned over to the other side, he may be tempted to forego 
conscientiously investigating his own case in the hope that he will obtain such 
information from the disclosure of the research, investigation, and thought processes 
compiled in the trial brief of opposing counsel.53
These are sound policy reasons promoting restricted production, but modem 
judicial activism has increasingly encroached on them. Traditionally, Canadian 
courts have acknowledged that litigation privilege is an attribute of the adversary 
mode at trial:
Under our adversary system of litigation, a lawyer’s preparation o f his 
client’s case must not be inhibited by the possibility that the materials that 
he prepares can be taken out of his file and presented to the Court in a 
manner other than that contemplated when they were being prepared... If 
lawyers were entitled to dip into each other’s briefs by means o f the 
discovery process, the straightforward preparation of cases for trial would 
develop into a most unsatisfactory travesty of our system.54
The Court did not explain how removing the availability of litigation privilege would 
result in a travesty of our system of civil justice.
52 Edgar v. Auld (2000), 225 N.B.R. (2d) 71 (C.A.).
53 Ottawa-Carleton (Regional Municipality) v. Consumer’s Gas Co. (1990), 74 O.R. (2d) 637 at 643.
54 Susan Hosiery Ltd. v. Minister o f  National Revenue, [1969] 2 Ex.C.R. 27 at para. 9.
However, in Strass v. Goldsack,55 a closer analysis of the implications of such a 
situation for the adversary system was undertaken. The Appellate Division of the 
Alberta Supreme Court had to decide whether privilege would be allowed to the 
defendant in a motor vehicle accident action for a witness statement taken from the 
plaintiff by an adjuster engaged to investigate the accident by the defendant’s 
insurer.
In a majority decision, the Court held that the statement was privileged on the 
ground that it was a communication made in anticipation of litigation. In response to 
the argument that a party ought to be allowed to see his own statement before trial 
and that otherwise, he might be unfairly taken by surprise, the answer was 
surprisingly blunt:
But why not? It is to be given to him before examination for discovery or 
trial so that he may tailor his evidence to be consistent? If he has been 
consistent in his version of the accident, his statement cannot hurt him. If 
he has a new version from that which he gave to investigators immediately 
following the accident, why should not his new version be tested by the 
production of the statement, not before he has given evidence, but after, by 
cross-examination? The proceedings are adversary proceedings.56
Such was the traditional judicial view in Canada that by the rules of the 
litigation game, a party had to wait until the trial before he could see his own 
statement when it was given under the circumstances in question.
Principles of Common Law, however, are always in a state of flux and this area 
of the law has been no exception. Indeed, prompted by legislative reforms of civil 
procedure throughout Canada and by unrelenting liberal pressure, these policy 
reasons have been significantly permeated by the modem and ever growing influence 
of broad relevancy. Such is the nature of civil due process at Common Law where 
apparently competing values ultimately serve a common purpose, as was noted 
recently by Corbett J. of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice when discussing the 
privilege of solicitor-client:
Further, the principles of solicitor/client privilege were developed in 
Britain long before current pre-trial disclosure obligations were developed.
It is now necessary, in Ontario, to disclose all relevant documents, and not 
just those to be relied upon at trial. It is now necessary to answer all 
relevant questions at discovery, and not just provide a list of trial 
witnesses. Thus, when the rules around privilege were developed, a party 
would not be required to vet all of its documents for privilege and then 
attend an examination which could last for many days, or, as in this case, 
weeks, to answer probing questions about why it acted as it has. With 
such arduous disclosure requirements has come a difficult task of ensuring
55 Strass v. Goldsack (1976), 58 D.L.R. (3d) 397 (Alta. S.C., App. Div.).
that, while discharging the positive obligations to disclose, a party does 
not inadvertently reveal some aspect of legal advice it has received, thus 
opening the door to a demand for disclosure of a broad range of privileged 
communications.57
3. The Trail Blazers: Ontario Courts Probing
Largely because of the twin thrust of two Ontario cases, nowadays, the trend is in the 
direction of more complete disclosure. Conventional wisdom holds that there is no 
apparent reason to inhibit this trend so long as counsel is left with sufficient 
flexibility to adequately serve the litigation client.
In Chrusz, the Court issued a comprehensive decision summarizing the 
principles applicable to solicitor-client and litigation privileges. The issue related to 
disclosure or privilege regarding a number of documents created in the course of an 
insurance adjuster investigating a hotel fire. The hotel owner and insured was 
ultimately charged with arson. During the course o f litigation, the contentious issue 
of privilege arose in relation to the following communications:
(a) communications with the lead fire insurer and its lawyer;
(b) communications between the claims adjuster and both the insurer and 
the lawyer; and
(c) communications between the claims adjuster or the insurer and third 
party, a witness statement, and a videotape.
The Ontario Court of Appeal adopted, as other appellate courts had done throughout 
Canada, the dominant purpose test as opposed to the substantial purpose of the 
document, on the basis that it better complied with contemporary trends in discovery.
Carthy J.A. found that solicitor-client privilege covered all communications 
between the insurer and its lawyer, but not communications between the claims 
adjuster and the lawyer. Carthy J.A., contemplating the basis of the dominant 
purpose principle, favoured litigation privilege as covering the communications 
between the claims adjuster and either the insurer or its lawyer occurring after 
litigation. However, Carthy J.A. also held that communications that took place prior 
to the time that litigation was contemplated were not protected by litigation privilege. 
He further held that documents and a videotape taken from the hotel were not created 
for the purpose of litigation and therefore did not qualify for any form of privilege in 
the hands of any party. Finally, applying the same dominant purpose test to copies 
of documents that appear in the course of investigating work, Carthy J.A. found that 
if original documents were not privileged, the copy of the documents in the hands of 
a lawyer were also not privileged. There was, however, disagreement as to the test to 
be used in determining whether litigation privilege applies in any given case.
(A) The Carthy Approach
On this specific topic of litigation privilege, two different positions were put forward 
by the Court of Appeal. The majority decision of the Court held that litigation 
privilege protects only against the adversary. Accordingly, litigation privilege is not 
necessarily waived by revealing privileged communications to an outsider. It 
follows that a witness statement was protected by litigation privilege in the hands of 
the lawyer and that privilege was not waived by the lawyer giving a copy of such to 
the witness. Because litigation privilege is against the adversary, there was nothing 
inconsistent in giving a copy of the statement to the witness while still maintaining 
privilege against the adversary. However, the privileged document in the hands of 
an outsider would only be protected by privilege if the principles of the common 
interest privilege apply.
(B) Common Interest Privilege
Common interest privilege arises when two or more parties are on the same side of 
anticipated litigation, whether or not both or all of the parties ultimately participate in 
the litigation. The purpose of the common interest privilege is to allow parties who 
have a common interest in the litigation to share the trial preparation efforts. Each 
party’s copy of a document remains privileged until litigation is no longer 
contemplated or until litigation is concluded. Carthy J.A. found that the copy of the 
witness statement in the hands of the witness was not protected by common interest 
privilege. Although he found that the witness was aligned in interest to the insurer, 
the witness did not acquire a common interest privilege because he was merely a 
witness and there was no contemplation that he would be involved in the litigation.
(C) The Doherty Approach
The second approach was highlighted by Doherty J.A., dissenting in part. Doherty 
J.A., dissenting with respect to the witness statement, concluded that it was not 
privileged in the hands of the insurer and that the insurer should be required to 
produce the statement. The witness statement was therefore not protected by 
litigation privilege either in the hands of the insurer or its insured.
Doherty J.A. found that the application of a privilege requires a two-step 
analysis. At the first step, the party claiming the privilege must prove that the 
material in question meets the dominant purpose test. In this analytical grid, Doherty 
J.A. found that the witness statement met the dominant purpose test and therefore 
qualified for litigation privilege.
At the second step, Doherty J.A. held that the party seeking production bears 
the burden of proving that other interests should prevail over the privilege claimed. 
Doherty J.A. based this step on the fact that no privilege is absolute and that 
therefore, any privilege can be overridden where "the harm to other societal interests 
in recognizing the privilege clearly outweighs any benefit to the interest fostered by
applying the privilege in the particular circumstances".58 Since litigation privilege is 
a confidentiality-based claim, it should be weighed against other interests in the same 
way that courts weigh other confidentiality-based claims against individual or 
societal interests. Other interests might outweigh the right to confidentiality 
protected by litigation privilege, including policies underlying the disclosure interest 
such as adjudicative fairness and adjudicative reliability. Doherty J.A. then 
concluded that the witness statement was admissible since societal interests in 
adjudicative fairness and adjudicative reliability outweighed the confidentiality 
interests.
Finally, Doherty J.A. disagreed with Carthy J.A.’s blank statement that copies 
of non-privileged documents that are placed into a lawyer’s brief in the course of 
preparing for litigation are never protected by litigation privilege. Doherty J.A. did 
not attempt to resolve the matter, but instead left it to be decided in a case that 
squarely raised the issue. On this narrow point of copies of documents, Doherty J.A. 
was supported by Rosenberg J.A. in that copies of non-privileged documents might 
be covered by litigation privilege. Like Doherty J.A., however, Rosenberg J.A. 
preferred to leave the question to be answered in circumstances where it arose on the 
facts.
(D) The Carthy Approach Prevailing
For the balance, however, Rosenberg J.A. largely concurred with Carthy J.A. 
Specifically, Rosenberg J.A. rejected the balancing approach proposed by Doherty 
J.A. and adopted Carthy J.A.’s approach to litigation privilege. The concern 
expressed by Rosenberg J.A. was that if a balancing approach were applied, it would 
lead to unnecessary uncertainty and proliferation of pre-trial motions. Nonetheless, 
Rosenberg J.A. agreed that litigation privilege is not absolute.
(E) Chrusz Majority Views on Litigation Privilege
In effect, litigation privilege is the area of privacy left to a solicitor after the current 
demands of discoverability have been met. Of course, there is a tension between 
them to the extent that when discovery is widened, the reasonable requirements of 
counsel to conduct litigation must be recognized. As was well-noted by the majority 
decision rendered by Carthy, J.A:
Our modem rules certainly have truncated what would previously have 
been protected from disclosure. Under rule 31.06(1), information cannot 
be refused on discovery on the ground that what is sought is evidence.
Under rule 31.06(2), the names and addresses of witnesses must be 
disclosed...
Rule 31.06(3) provides for discovery of the name and address and the 
findings, conclusions and opinions of an expert, unless the party 
undertakes not to call that expert at trial. This is an example of the Rules
Committee recognizing the right to proceed in privacy to obtain opinions 
and to maintain their confidentiality if found to be unfavourable. The 
tactical room for the advocate to manoeuvre is preserved while the 
interests of a fair trial and early settlement are supported....
In a very real sense, litigation privilege is being defined by the rules as 
they are amended from time to time. Judicial decisions should be 
consonant with those changes and should be driven more by the modem 
realities of the conduct of litigation and perceptions of discoverability than 
by historic precedents bom in a very different context.59
This statement reflects the main stream of current judicial views on the scope and 
effect of litigation privilege. This privilege is therefore limited.
While the Ontario Court of Appeal had to grasp the issue of legal privilege in 
the context of litigation, a lower Ontario Court tackled the issue of the foundation of 
expert reports and claims for privilege.
In Browne (Litigation Guardian of) v. Lavery,60 the defendant produced a 
report from an expert that referred to a report prepared by another expert. The 
defendant claimed privilege for the other expert’s report and undertook not to call 
him at trial. In the following skirmish at the examination for discovery, in an attempt 
to find an acceptable solution to the dispute, the defendant’s solicitor allowed the 
plaintiffs solicitor to interview the other expert.
In the ensuing motion seeking production of the other expert’s earlier report, 
Ferguson J. held that litigation privilege had been waived when the defendant’s 
solicitor permitted plaintiffs counsel to interview the other expert. Alternatively, the 
Court held that in any event, the earlier expert’s report was included within the scope 
of “findings”.
In reaching his conclusions, Ferguson J. relied on the broad interpretation of the 
term “findings” given by the recent judicial trend, the Ontario Court of Appeal 
decision of Chrusz, and the case of R. v. Stone.61 Disclosure according to this ruling 
is wide enough to include documents considered by an expert.
Although Browne has been alluring to a large judicial audience coast to coast, it 
has the inherent weakness of lacking appellate authority. Moreover, as of yet, there 
has not been a critical analysis for various benches of its analytical foundations, 
including the number of crucial assumptions made by Ferguson J. in relying on 
Stone. This latter case from the Supreme Court of Canada dealt with issues in the 
criminal context. A closer look at this aspect of the reasons of Ferguson J. could lead
59 Chrusz, supra note 25 at paras. 26-28.
60 Browne, supra note 4.
61 R .v . Stone, [ 1999] 2 S.C.R. 290.
to a reassessment of the propriety of his application of Stone to the civil litigation 
context.
There is also a more pressing issue concerning the propriety of Browne. 
Recently, the Court of Appeal of Ontario, in Conceicao Farms Inc. v. Zeneca Corp., 
when commenting on the interaction between Rule 31.06(3) and litigation privilege, 
said the following, at paragraph 14:
There is an area of debate concerning the scope of information that may be 
obtained pursuant to this rule. It clearly encompasses not only the expert’s 
opinion, but the facts on which the opinion is based, the instructions upon 
which the expert proceeded, and the expert’s name and address. How far 
beyond this the right to obtain foundational information... extends, need 
not be determined here. Suffice it to say that we are of the view that it 
does not yet extend as far as is tentatively suggested in Browne (Litigation 
Guardian of) v. Lavery... We simply proceed on the basis that the rule 
entitles the appellant to obtain on discovery the foundational information 
for doctor Grafius’ final opinion. As will become clear, we need not 
decide in this case the precise extent of the information that is 
discoverable.62
On a motion heard initially by a judge alone of the Court of Appeal in Ontario, 
Gillese, J.A., had commented as follows:
In my view, the reasoning in R. v. Stone, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 290 and Chrusz 
support a broad interpretation of rule 31.06(3) and a corresponding 
narrowing of litigation privilege in the area of expert reports.
At paragraph 99 of Stone, Binnie J., in dissent but not on this point, states:
[0]nce a witness takes the stand, he/she can no longer 
be characterized as offering advice to a party. They are 
offering an opinion for the assistance to the court. As 
such, the opposing party must be given access to the 
foundation of such opinions to test them adequately.
Although these comments are made in the context of a criminal 
proceeding, there is nothing to suggest that they are limited to such 
proceedings.63
The Court of Appeal thought otherwise. The Court held that litigation privilege 
attached to a document is not erased simply because some or all of the information in 
the document must be disclosed if asked for on discovery. The Court acknowledges 
that the examining party can obtain on discovery the foundational information 
contained in a memorandum prepared by the solicitor who intends to call an expert.
62 Conceicao Farms Inc. v. Zeneca Corp. (2006), 272 D.L.R. (4th) 545 (Ont. C.A.) at para. 14, leave to 
appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada denied March 8, 2007 [Conceicao, Ont. C.A.].
63 Conceicao Farms Inc. v. Zeneca Corp. (2006), 82 O.R. (3d) 229 at paras 32 to 34 (C.A.), Gillese, J.A., 
in Chambers [Conceiacao],
However, the Court also noted that the rule does not give the examining party the 
right to production of the memorandum itself, but rather to obtain discovery of the 
foundational information for the findings, opinions, and conclusion of the expert 
contained in the memorandum. The court went on to note that the case did not 
suggest a need to modify the rule of litigation privilege where experts are concerned:
There is no doubt that litigation privilege attached to the March 14, 2000, 
memorandum. It was prepared by counsel as part of defending the 
lawsuit. That was its substantial if not its only purpose. Moreover, as is 
made clear in the recently decided case of Blank v. Canada (Minister o f  
Justice)..., there can be no doubt that this privilege continues because the 
litigation continues.
Taking as a given that a document protected by litigation privilege and part 
of counsel’s work product contains the foundation for an expert opinion, 
there is no need to remove the privilege for the document itself to do 
justice. The foundational information in the document is available under 
Rule 31.06(3), if it is sought on discovery. Removing the privilege for the 
document itself is not necessary to obtain that information, but does run the 
risk of requiring disclosure of properly privileged information that is often 
intertwined with discoverable information in the lawyer’s work product
The Court concluded that the memorandum itself, prepared by counsel as a result of 
his discussion with his expert, was part of the lawyer’s work product and thus 
protected by litigation privilege and not subject to disclosure.
As to the timeliness of that motion, the court held that:
The rule does not give them the right to production of the memorandum, 
but rather to obtain discovery of the foundational information for the 
findings, opinions, and conclusions of Dr. Grafius contained in the 
memorandum. That is a right they had right up to trial. There is no basis 
in the rule or in fairness to give them the same right, by means of the 
production of the memorandum, now that the trial has been concluded.
For the trial process to function fairly and properly, parties must exercise 
their right to obtain discovery at the discovery stage, not seek to do so 
after trial.65
An interesting feature in this decision of the Court of Appeal (holding that the 
memorandum of the defendant’s counsel need not be produced) is that it drew a 
distinction between the information that the party is entitled to get on an examination 
for discovery and the production of documents.
The Court agreed that the plaintiff would have been entitled to question the 
defendants on discovery about the foundational information underlying their expert’s
64 Conceicao, Ont. C.A. supra note 62 at paras. 20-21.
65 Ibid. at para. 19.
report. However, the Court noted that it was not deciding the precise extent of what 
is discoverable as part of Rule 31.06(3)’s "findings, opinions, and conclusions" of an 
expert. This issue has to be decided on another occasion.
As can be seen in recent years, courts are inclined to limit the scope of litigation 
privilege while expanding the scope of the discovery process based on the concept of 
“broad relevance”. But where does that leave the issues of production of instructing 
letters from counsel and production of draft reports and related documents from 
experts?
4. Instructing Letters from Counsel and Expert Preliminary Reports: 
Confidentiality Cloaked in Candour -  and Justice for All?
One of the important aspects of the cross-examination of an expert witness and 
preparation of one’s own expert is the careful consideration of the facts underlying 
the expert’s report. Such information is vital not only to expose the weak 
assumptions made by the expert, but also to determine if there are any facts that, had 
they been brought to the attention of the expert for his consideration, would have 
materially altered the conclusions reached in the report. This also includes any 
undue influence precipitated by instructing letters from counsel to the expert.
The information may be obtained through a review of the expert’s draft reports 
and a careful comparison between these earlier drafts and the final report. This is a 
fertile field for skirmishes at discovery and major battlegrounds at trial on cross- 
examination. Although the standard of disclosure in relation to anticipated expert 
trial testimony is well defined at discovery, there is a lingering issue that remains to 
be explored: whether at the discovery stage an expert’s written report itself, if 
prepared in anticipation of litigation, still remains technically privileged so that its 
production can only be insisted on at the eve of trial under relevant rules of 
procedure.66
Nowadays, the assessment of the competing interest of privilege versus 
disclosure favours full and timely disclosure, especially when the materials sought 
from an expert’s file are protected by litigation privilege only. The scope of the 
interests protected by litigation privilege is much narrower than that protected by the 
solicitor-client privilege. Therefore, an expert whose files are demanded for 
production will generally be required to disclose those materials containing 
information that support the expressed conclusions and which are protected by 
litigation privilege only. In Jesionowski v. Wa-Yas61, the Court said, at page 47:
The need for a protected area to facilitate a lawyer’s investigation and 
preparation of a case does not extend to the information provided to an 
expert if that expert is called to the stand. Another way of saying the same
66 See Garry Watson and Michael McGowan, Ontario Civil Practice 2005 (Toronto: Carswell, 2005) 
at 706.
67 Jesionowski v. Wa-Yas ( The ) (1992), 55 F.T.R. 1(T.D.).
thing is: while the operation of the adversarial trial process requires 
protection of counsel’s work product, it does not require protection of an 
expert witness work product.68
This healthy tension between antithetical values of civil justice, both of which 
are accepted as fundamental to the civil litigation process, may be cloaked in the 
garbs of the quintessential pillar of systems of law based on the common law: due 
process. The assertion of litigation privilege is essential to the effective operation of 
the adversarial model of litigation.69 Nowadays, however, this privilege is 
inextricably linked with the very system that desires the disclosure of documents.
5. Instructing Letters From Counsel
(A) The Initial Restricted Production Theory: Assertion of Litigation Privilege
The initial restricted theory has found proponents throughout Canada advocating 
privilege over instructing letters from counsel to expert. In Calvaruso v. Nantais70 
the defendants sought a copy of the plaintiffs correspondence to the plaintiffs 
experts.
The defendants made a wide sweeping argument that generally, litigation in 
Ontario had entered a new era of complete disclosure, so nothing should be held 
back or kept secret that could possibly assist another party in preparation or in cross- 
examination. Particularly suspicious was the fact that the opinion of the expert was 
expressed in 16 numbered points, thus suggesting that the expert was answering a 
series of questions put by the plaintiffs counsel which, if true, might mean the 
questions coloured the answers.
Brockenshire J. dismissed the motion stating:
the principle is that there still exists solicitor-and-client or litigation- 
purpose privilege, as one of the essential underpinnings of our system of 
administration of justice, which should not be lightly interfered with.
Here, the opinion letter does not say that it is in response to questions 
posed by the plaintiffs counsel, nor does it say that it is based in any way 
on information provided by such counsel. The affidavit in support does 
not indicate any reason for production of the instructing letter that would 
outweigh the privileges above mentioned. I found that there was no 
foundation in the material before me requiring production of the 
instructing correspondence.71
68 Ibid. at para. 8.
69 Moseley, supra note 46 at paras. 20-21.
70 Calvaruso v. Nantais (1992), 7 C.P.C. (3d) 254 (O.C.J., Gen. Div.).
71 Ibid. at paras. 4-5.
Brockenshire J. did not rule out, however, the additional possibility that the trial 
judge could order production as a result of cross-examination of the expert at trial.
In disregarding this argument, the Court relied on an earlier case: Bell Canada 
v. Olympia & York Development Ltd.11 where in 1989, at the trial of an action, the 
solicitors for the plaintiff called an expert to which they had supplied documentary 
evidence in advance. The second defendant sought to have production of that 
documentary evidence. Following refusal from the plaintiff, the second defendant 
moved for an order of production. The Court rejected that motion.
The Calvaruso principle has had a large following in Nova Scotia, New 
Brunswick, Ontario, and British Columbia.
In Crocher v. MacDonald73, the plaintiff had applied for an order requiring a 
defendant doctor to give an opinion of the treatment given to the plaintiff by another 
defendant doctor, both of whom were involved in the medical procedure out of 
which that action arose. The plaintiff also sought an order requiring defence counsel 
to produce letters sent to its expert.
The Nova Scotia Supreme Court Trial Division dismissed the application and 
held that correspondence from counsel to medical experts was protected by solicitor- 
client privilege. This case is noteworthy because the Court confused litigation 
privilege with solicitor-client privilege and deemed the instructing letter to the 
medical expert as privileged.
In New Brunswick, Calvaruso was followed in O ’Neill v. Campbell and 
Campbell.74 The Court stated at page 2:
I think this goes too far. A party’s solicitor should be able to 
communicate with expert witnesses in the preparation of client’s case 
without the requirement of disclosure of these communications upon 
request.
Full disclosure is an accepted goal of present-day litigation. At the same 
time, a solicitor and a client must be able to conduct the preparation of 
their case with some degree of confidentiality. They cannot withhold 
material evidence and must disclose material facts, but they should be able 
to present their subjective positions to prospective witnesses, as a matter 
of preparation of their case, without disclosure of where they see their 
position to be.75
72 Bell Canada v. Olympia & York Development Ltd. (1989), 68 O.R. (2d) 103 (Ont. H.C.), Eberle, J [Bell 
Canada].
73 Crocher v. MacDonald (1992), 116 N.S.R. (2d) 181 (T.D.)
74 O ’Neill v. Campbell and Campbell (1994), 159 N.B.R. (2d) 273 at para. 8 (Q.B.T.D), Creaghan, J.
74 Ibid. at paras. 8-9.
In concluding, Creaghan J. found that as a matter of right, the opposed party is not 
entitled to production of instructing letters from a solicitor to an expert.
In Edgar v. Auld76, the defendants brought a motion for the production of the 
plaintiffs counsel’s correspondence to the plaintiffs treating physician to obtain 
reports. The motion judge dismissed the motion.
In Cyr v. Richey11, the defendant Richey had brought a motion for an order 
requiring the plaintiff Cyr to submit to a medical examination by a neurologist, 
Dr. Robinson. Richey’s solicitor had provided a copy of his letter to Dr. Robinson 
confirming his retainer to Cyr’s solicitor. In the letter, he made comments about his 
concerns about whether the report provided by Dr. Thibodeau, Cyr’s doctor, was 
biased, as Dr. Thibodeau was the brother of Cyr’s solicitor. Cyr felt that 
Dr. Robinson was now bound to minimize Dr. Thibodeau’s expertise and show bias 
in his own assessment of her injuries and the future consequences. She was ready to 
consent to a medical doctor chosen by Richey other than Dr. Robinson.
In allowing the motion, the Court noted that the comment made by Richey’s 
solicitor regarding Dr. Thibodeau’s report was improper and should not have been 
made. That, however, did not disqualify the medical specialist from conducting a 
medical examination of the plaintiff. But the Court did not leave the matter at that 
and made the following comment while following O ’Neill, at paragraph 13:
As a final comment, I cannot help but feel that the issue in this motion 
should have been a ‘non issue’ had the defendant not copied his letter to 
Dr. Robinson to the plaintiffs lawyer. Much as the plaintiff was entitled 
to a copy of the report and of all material used by the doctor in preparation 
of his report, he was not entitled to the communications between the 
solicitor and the medical expert prior to the examination.
In Ontario, the production of an instructing letter from counsel to the treating 
physician in a slip-and-fall action was refused in Mahon v. Standard Life Assurance 
Co.19 where the Court came to a similar conclusion.
In the British Columbia case of Ocean Falls Corp. v. Worthington (Canada) 
/«c.80 the Court dismissed an application whereby the defendant had sought 
production of the correspondence between the plaintiffs solicitors and its consulting 
engineers. The Court dismissed that application on the basis of the reasoning
76 Edgar v. Auld (1999), 212 N.B.R. (2d) 293, affirmed by the Court of Appeal (2000), 225 N.B.R. (2d)
71 (C.A.).
77 Cyr v. Richey (2004), 278 N.B.R. (2d) 158 (Q.B.).
78 Ibid. at para 12.
79 Mahon v. Standard Life Assurance Co., [2000] O.J. No. 2042 (S.C., Master).
80 Ocean Falls Corp. v. Worthington (Canada) Inc. (1985), 69 B.C.L.R. 124 (S.C.).
expressed earlier in Strass by concluding that those communications had been made 
in confidence and that there had been no waiver of privilege by the plaintiff.
(B) The Second Coming of Candour -  Broad Relevancy at Work: Assertion of 
Production as a Means of Civil Justice
The assertion of production as a means of civil justice has also found followers. In 
Greenwood Shopping Plaza Ltd. v. Buchanan (Neil J.) L td }1, the Nova Scotia Court 
stated:
It seems to me only logical that if the party wished to rely upon the 
testimony of its expert and was prepared to waive the privilege that he 
must also have intended to waive the privilege that extends to his 
discussions with the expert which forms the basis of his report. Surely if 
the solicitor were called to testify as to an opinion given to his client he 
would have to reveal the facts related to him upon which the opinion was 
based. Similarly, in my opinion, an expert employed by the solicitor for 
the benefit of the party must, as an integral part o f his evidence, be subject 
to cross examination on the factual basis for his opinions, and this must be 
known to the party at the time the decision is made to waive the privilege 
and present the evidence.82
Subsequently, a letter was produced showing that the plaintiffs counsel wrote 
to an accident reconstructionist after the reconstructionist provided his first draft of a 
report that was ordered. In Flinn v. McFarland83, McAdam J. observed:
At issue is the independence of the expert’s report. The expert apparently 
prepared a draft report which he forwarded to counsel for the plaintiff for 
comments and upon receipt of comments prepared a final report which has 
been disclosed to the defendants. Clearly, the extent to which the final 
report of the expert may be the result of counsel’s comments, is both 
relevant and entitled to be examined by counsel for the defendants. This, 
however, does not extend to any earlier drafts the expert may have 
prepared which he, himself, may have amended, altered, or revised in the 
course of considering the issues and his opinions. It is the fact the expert 
submitted a draft report to counsel for the plaintiff and then prepared a 
final report, that may or may not have been revised in accordance with 
suggestions by counsel for the plaintiff, that the defendants are entitled to 
pursue in examination the expert as to his opinions and the basis on which 
he reached his opinions, including to the extent the opinions offered are 
his or may be the consequence of suggestions by plaintiffs counsel.84
The Court specifically followed Browne even though it had involved the 
interpretation and application of Rule 31.05(3) of the Ontario Rules o f Civil
81 Greenwood Shopping Plaza Ltd. v. Buchanan (Neil J.) Ltd. (1979), 31 N.S.R. (2d) 135 (C.A.).
82 Ibid. at para. 59.
83 Flinn v. McFarland (2002), 211 N.S.R. (2d) 201 (S.C.).
84 Ibid. at para. 9.
Procedure in respect to disclosure required of a party intending to call an expert 
witness at trial. The Court noted, in relation to this, as follows:
The Rule in Ontario is, in its wording, broader and more specific as to the 
production required of a party who has signalled an intention to call an 
expert at trial. Nevertheless having regard to the authorities which have 
considered the relevant Nova Scotia Rules, it is clear, the principles 
reviewed and upheld by Justice Ferguson are no less applicable in Nova 
Scotia.85
McAdam J. echoed the lament of Ferguson J. in the Browne case by agreeing that 
this area of the case law cried out for appellate review.
In the Ontario case of Enterprise Excellence Corp. v. Royal Bank86, the 
plaintiffs brought an action against the bank for misappropriation of confidential 
information and they retained an accountant to prepare a damage report, estimating 
their damages. The plaintiffs’ lawyer provided the expert with a draft of his written 
argument. At the examination for discovery, he claimed the draft was protected on 
the basis of litigation privilege. The defendant sought an order requesting the 
plaintiffs to produce this information provided to the accountant to assist the 
accountant in the preparation of the damage report, which was subsequently 
produced to Royal Bank.
The Court found that the plaintiffs had waived any privilege that attached to the 
report on damages prepared by the accountant, the factual content of their lawyer’s 
written argument, and telephone conversations with the expert, as these materials 
were provided to him to assist in preparing his report on damages.
The Court first held that production of the report came within the scope of 
Rule 31.06(3). The issue became whether the draft document sent by the plaintiffs’ 
lawyer to the expert was to be included in the “findings” referred to in subrule 
31.06(3)(a). The Court held that the lawyer’s written argument provided to the 
expert and the factual content of the telephone conversations with the expert were 
findings within the meaning of Rule 31.06(3). Furthermore, the Court held that, in 
the circumstances, litigation privilege that would protect these documents had been 
waived by implication and ordered production.
In Turner (Litigation Guardian of) v. Dycksl, the Court stated that:
The scope of ‘findings, opinions, and conclusions’ in rule 31.06 is broad 
and includes information and data obtained by the expert, contained in 
documents or obtained through interviews on the basis of which
85 Ibid at para. 11.
86 Enterprise Excellence Corp. v. Royal Bank (2000), 9 C.P.C. (5th) 362 (S.C.).
87 Turner, supra note 10.
conclusions are drawn and opinions are formed. The information and data 
can include research, documents, calculations, and factual data and the 
words ‘findings, opinions, and conclusions’ are broad enough to include 
the field notes, raw data, and records made and used by the expert in 
preparing his or her report to the extent that factual underpinnings in 
support of the opinions or conclusions are not set out in the report.88
The Court then considered the extent of the duty to disclose associated with a 
report’s conclusions. The Court said at paragraph 16:
To the extent that the opinions and conclusions in the report are based 
upon information communicated by counsel to the experts, even though 
the result of research and the work product of counsel, the provision of 
such information to the experts and the reliance upon same by the experts 
in coming to their opinions and conclusions waives any privilege which 
may attach to such information...89
Finally, on May 6, 2004, Master Dash of the Ontario Superior Court in Walker v. 
Baskin Robbins90 dealt with a motion from the defendant seeking production of the 
instructing letter from the plaintiff to the expert who prepared an income loss report.
The expert had specifically stated that in preparing his expert report, he had 
relied on information provided by the plaintiff’s solicitor. The Master concluded, in 
relation to this assertion, that the information provided by the plaintiff had to mean 
the retainer letter from counsel:
All information provided to and relied upon by an expert are part of the 
expert’s ‘findings’ and must be disclosed pursuant to Rule 31.06(3):
Browne v. Lavery (2002), 58 O.R. (3d) 40 (S.C.J.). This is a different 
situation from Calvaruso v. Nantais [1992] O.J. No. 435 (O.C.G.D.), 
where the solicitor’s instructing letter was not ordered disclosed because 
the expert did not state that his report was based on information provided 
by counsel. In this case, Goldhar specifically did rely on the information 
provided by Miss Amendola. The instructing letter will be produced.91
Counsel should be very careful in what he includes in instructing letters to 
experts. Any discussion of tactics is best done verbally or in separate 
correspondence. Facts and assumptions that instructing counsel wishes to provide to 
the expert should be communicated clearly and concisely in separate 
correspondence. Accuracy in presenting facts will also be important as well as valid 
assumptions. Every letter to an expert should be written as though it will be an open 
letter to all, as opposed to confidential correspondence.
88 Ibid. at para. 16.
89 Ibid.
90 Walker v. Baskin Robbins, [2004] O.J. No. 1930 [Walker].
91 Ibid. at para. 7.
Counsel must take great care in preparing instructing letters to his expert since 
the letters must be disclosed and it is possible that the court may order production. It 
is therefore important for counsel to ensure that any information or documentation 
provided to an expert is scrupulously accurate and fair, that the tone of counsel’s 
correspondence is fair, and that there is no implication that can be drawn from the 
letter that the expert is expected to do anything other than provide a fair and 
objective report. Every letter to an expert should be written as though it will 
eventually be produced and reviewed by the court. Any errors, inaccurate 
information, or poor assumptions will only provide a fertile ground for 
cross-examination of the expert.92
The expert’s report and file are becoming subject to unrelenting pressure 
brought about by modem day disclosure requirements. Solicitors dealing with 
experts should assume that communications with their expert and any draft report 
could be subject to examination. Preventive measures should include that:
(a) Solicitor retainer letters to the expert should not suggest the opinion 
desired;
(b) Insuring that the expert receives an objective set of facts;
(c) Limiting communications between counsel and expert while the expert is 
reviewing the facts and formulating the substance of his or her opinion;
(d) Discussing the expert’s views orally before he or she provides anything 
in writing;
(e) Limiting the number of drafts provided to counsel; and
(f) Keeping counsel’s editing of the report to a minimum.93 
7. Production Of Expert Preliminary Reports
The issue of disclosure of draft reports and other working papers of an expert may 
arise as part of the discovery process or at trial in the context of cross-examination. 
In Ontario, Rule 31.06(3) of the Rules o f Civil Procedure94 provides that an 
opposing party may obtain discovery with regard to the findings, opinions, and 
conclusions of an expert retained by a party being examined unless the party
92 George A McAllister, “Getting the Expert’s Report and Preparing the Expert for Trial” (Atlantic 
Provinces Trial Lawyers Association -  Chronic Pain Cases: Winning Strategies in the Threshold Era,
19 November 2004).
93 Donald B. Houston and Jeanne L. Pratt, “Practice and Procedure in Commercial Litigation & Forensic 
Accounting: Litigating the Commercial Dispute”, Expert Reports, The Grand Hotel, Toronto, 14-15 
November 2003.
94 Rules o f  Civil Procedure, supra note 20.
undertakes not to call the expert as a witness at trial. Furthermore, at trial, although 
litigation privilege protects communications between a solicitor and third party made 
for the dominate purpose of actual or contemplated litigation, the privilege has been 
deemed waived in certain cases the moment that an expert takes the stand. The 
immediate consequence of such a waiver is to open the expert to cross-examination 
on, and production of, preliminary drafts and working papers compiled in the course 
of formulating his opinion.
As with the other issue under discussion, there is conflicting authority as to 
whether an expert testifying at trial can be obliged to produce his draft reports.
(A) The Initial Restricted Production Theory: Assertion of Litigation Privilege
The initial restricted production theory held sway in the early years of modern-day 
litigation. Production of an expert’s report did not act as a waiver o f the privilege 
attaching to the expert’s notes and records.95 It was well-established that privilege 
over an expert’s file could not be lost by calling the expert as a witness at trial. 
However, privilege could be considered waived regarding facts or assumptions 
provided to the expert by counsel, if such facts or assumptions formed the basis of 
the expert’s opinion and were not otherwise provided as evidence.96 Indeed, an 
expert witness consulted but not retained by one party could be called at trial by the 
opposite party, but could not, due to litigation privilege, disclose confidential 
information received from the first party’s counsel.97
In Bell Canada the defendant sought production of everything that the solicitor 
who retained the expert had sent to the expert. The Court rejected the conclusions of 
Vancouver Community College v. Phillips, Barratt98 as inconsistent with the 
principles of solicitor-client privilege and questioned the basis on which that case 
was decided:
Even if one were to go as far as Mr. Justice Finch has done in describing 
the implication behind the presentation of a witness at trial, I am of the 
opinion that the conclusion he reaches is at least doubtful.
It appears to me to be a rather long step between offering a witness as 
credible and a conclusion that dissolves the solicitor-and-client or 
litigation -  purpose privilege, either or both of them.
It seems to me that if his conclusion is valid, it would lead almost 
invariability to the conclusion that a party who becomes a witness could
95 Bronsteter et al. v. Davies (1986), 11 C.P.C. (2d) 289 (Ont. H.C.)
96 Piché v. Lecours Lumber Co. (1993), 13 O.R. (3d) 193 (Ont. Gen. Div.) [Piche'].
97 Cousineau v. Saint Joseph’s Health Centre (1990), 49 C.P.C. (2d) 306 (Ont. H.C.).
98 Vancouver Community College v. Phillips, Barratt (1987), 20 B.C.L.R. (2d) 289 (S.C) [Vancouver 
College].
well be in danger of cross examination on communications passing 
between him and his solicitor."
To avoid the possibility of making all communications between a witness and 
the solicitor subject to cross-examination, the Court followed “traditional 
authorities”, which held that communications between solicitor-client and between 
solicitor and third party are privileged.
In Piché v. Lecours Lumber Co.100 the Court held that tendering an expert at 
trial does not operate as an automatic waiver of privilege over the entire expert’s file, 
but only of the facts and assumptions provided to the expert by counsel if those facts 
and assumptions form the basis of the expert’s opinion.
The following principles were set by Piché in regards to the extent of disclosure 
obligation in relation to an expert’s file:
(a) Principles of waiver relating to a privilege claim for documents in an 
expert’s file cannot be said to have been waived simply by calling that 
witness to give evidence;
(b) Privilege can be waived in respect to those facts or premises in the 
expert’s file, which have been used to base the expert’s opinion and which 
came to the expert’s knowledge from documents supplied to that expert;
(c) Whether there is a privilege or not can be ascertained by one of two ways: 
either the judge can examine the documents or materials for which 
privilege is claimed, or another way is for counsel, through cross- 
examination of the expert, to determine whether all or part of the file is 
privileged; and
(d) As a general rule, if facts are supplied that are not found in other evidence 
or if certain assumptions are asked to be made in the instructing 
documents, privilege claimed in those facts or assumptions should be 
considered waived.
At first blush, it is obvious that the court attempted to find a middle ground 
between protecting the privilege attached to certain documents in an expert’s file and 
allowing the court to assess all information and assumptions on which an expert’s 
conclusions are based. Indeed, such disclosures are often necessary if the trier of fact 
is to be able to assess the weight of the expert’s evidence with a reasonable degree of 
accuracy.
99 Bell Canada, supra note 72 at 106.
100 Piché, supra note 96.
Piché shows some evidence of relaxation from the strict rule set out in Bell 
Canada. Piché was followed both in Alberta and Ontario: City o f Edmonton v. Lovat 
Tunnel Equipment Inc.101 and Arbesman v. Meighen Demers.102
In Arbesman, the expert’s report referred to interviews that the expert had 
conducted with the plaintiffs. The defendants sought production of those documents 
and the plaintiffs provided the defendants with blacked-out documents. The 
defendants sought production of them in their unedited form. Both the Master and 
Rouleau J. on appeal held that since the expert did not rely on matters in those parts 
of the written memorandum and hand-written notes which had been blacked-out, 
those blacked-out passages did not contain findings within the meaning of 
Rule 31.06(3). Master Hawkins concluded that privilege in the blacked-out passages 
in the typewritten memorandum and the hand-written notes had not been waived and 
that the information in those passages was not a finding under the appropriate rule. 
The defendants were not obliged to produce those documents in their unedited form 
before trial. This conclusion is opposite to that in Browne, where Ferguson J. 
ordered production of information provided to the expert even if it was not relied on 
by the expert.
In New Brunswick, in Fougère v. Acadia Drug (1969) Ltd.,m  the Court 
appeared to take a conservative approach to the issue. It noted the decision of
Beckett J. in the case Kelly v. Kelly,104 where Beckett J. said:
I do not consider preliminary drafts o f a report prepared by an expert 
witness for the purpose of litigation to be ‘findings, opinions and 
conclusions of the expert’. An expert’s report may go through many 
preliminary drafts, but it is only the final draft or final report which the 
opposing party may obtain on discovery.105
After considering related Ontario jurisprudence, the doctrine of solicitor-client 
privilege, and the American “work product” doctrine, Riordon J. concluded:
In light of the protection traditionally given to the lawyer’s work product, 
it is my opinion that the obligation to disclose ‘findings, opinions and 
conclusions of the expert’ under Rule 32.06(3) means supplying a copy of 
the final report of the expert.106
101 City o f  Edmonton v. Lovat Tunnel Equipment Inc. (2000) 79 Alta. L.R. (3d) 268.
102 Arbesman v. Meighen Demers, [2003] O.J. No. 2984 (S.C.).
103 Fougère v. Acadia Drug (1969) Ltd. (1993), 206 N.B.R. (2d) 1 (Q.B.), Riordon J .[Fougère].
104 Kelly v. Kelly (1990), 42 C.P.C. (2d) 181(U.F.C.) [Kelly],
105 Fougère, supra note 103 at para. 23.
106 Ibid at para. 25.
In Nowe v. Reeves107 the Nova Scotia court dealt with the issue of producing 
drafts o f the expert’s report in the context of trial. Although, litigation privilege can 
be claimed on final and draft reports before they are served, the real question is 
whether the act of serving a report or notice or calling an expert as witness at trial 
operates as a waiver of privilege. The Court noted the following in respect to this 
issue:
There are two divergent schools of thought on the issue. One; a restrictive 
one in Ontario and perhaps a broader one in B.C. and I think it developed 
from the basic attitude in the rules, or basic rules over the years. Ontario 
follows the more restrictive English practice.108
Note that these comments regarding the Ontario practice were made before the case 
of Browne.
In lockstep with the conclusion in Bell Canada, the Nova Scotia Court in 
Highland Fisheries Ltd. v. Lynk Electric Ltd.m  refused to order production of the 
expert’s preliminary report. The issue in that case was whether an implied waiver of 
privilege applied only to the expert’s report which was tendered and the facts on 
which that report was based. The Court held that in Nova Scotia, the waiver of 
privilege extends to the expert’s report and the factual basis for the opinions 
expressed in that report only and not the preliminary report.
In the case of Aviaco International Leasing Inc. v. Boeing Canada Inc.uo the 
Superior Court also had to deal with a motion requesting production of drafts of the 
plaintiffs’ expert report. The plaintiffs contended that the defendants were not 
entitled to the drafts of the report but only to the report itself. They relied on a 1990 
Ontario case111 where the Court held that the drafts of an expert report were not 
producible because they did not constitute findings, opinions, and conclusions of the 
expert within the meaning of Rule 31.06(3) of the Rules of Civil Procedure in 
Ontario. The defendants countered by relying on Browne. This case illustrates the 
raging debate even among courts o f the same jurisdiction. In reaching its conclusion, 
the Court held as follows:
I do not agree with the conclusion reached by Beckett, U.F.C.J. In my 
view, draft reports represent, at the very least, preliminary findings, 
opinions, and conclusions of the expert and therefore fall within the scope 
of the rule. Such an interpretation of the rule would appear to accord with 
the general principle that the Rules of Civil Procedure are to be “liberally
107 Nowe v. Reeves (1996) 152 N.S.R. (2d) 206.
108 Ibid. at para. 2.
109 Highland Fisheries Ltd. v. Lynk Electric Ltd. (1989), 63 D.L.R. (4th) 493 (N.S.S.C.)
110 Aviaco International Leasing Inc. v. Boeing Canada Inc., [2002] O.J. No. 3799 (S.C.) at para. 16 
[Aviaco],
111 Kelly, supra note 104.
construed” -  see Rule 1.04(1). It also seems to me, for the reasons 
expressed by Ferguson, J., in Browne, that the party ought to be able to 
explore with an expert whether he or she changed her views from draft to 
draft and, if so, why. It is all part of testing the expert’s conclusions. It is 
also important that this material be produced in advance of the trial so that 
the trial is not interrupted while such material is reviewed. The question is 
therefore ordered to be answered.112
(B) The Second Coming of Candour -  Broad Relevancy at Work: Assertion of
Production as a Means of Civil Justice
Candour and production of draft reports have also found acceptance.
In Vancouver College the plaintiffs expert had been called to testify on his 
report and the defendant had moved for production of various documents in the 
expert’s possession. The issue was to what extent litigation privilege attached to the 
drafts had been lost by calling the expert to testify.
The Court held that once an expert becomes a witness, the party calling the 
expert has impliedly waived any privilege with respect to any documents in the 
expert’s possession that are relevant to the preparation or formulation o f opinions. It 
concluded that in such a case, the expert could be required to produce all documents 
in his possession that may be relevant to matters of substance in his evidence or to 
his credibility, unless it would be unfair or inconsistent to require such production. 
This would encompass any draft copies the expert may have in his possession. 
Indeed, in a subsequent ruling, the Court ordered production of several copies of the 
draft report contained in counsel’s file, including annotated reports by the lawyer 
himself. The Court held that the waiver o f the privilege extended not only to 
documents in the expert’s possession, but also to papers under the power and control 
of the party and included documents in the possession of the party’s lawyer.
According to this school of thought, once a witness takes the stand he is taken 
to have waived any privilege over his documents:
So long as the expert remains in the role of a confidential advisor, there 
are sound reasons for maintaining privilege over documents in his 
possession. Once he becomes a witness, however, his role is substantially 
changed. His opinions and their foundation are no longer private advice 
for the party who retained him....
It seems to me that in holding out the witness’s opinion as trustworthy, 
the party calling him impliedly waives any privilege that seriously 
protected the expert’s papers from production. He presents his evidence to 
the court and represents, at least at the outset, that the evidence will 
withstand even the most rigorous cross-examination. That constitutes an 
implied waiver over papers in a witness’s possession which are relevant to 
the preparation or formulation of the opinions offered, as well as to his
112 Aviaco, supra note 110 at para. 16.
consistency, reliability, qualifications and other matters touching his 
credibility.113
British Columbia courts have followed this approach. Subsequently, in 
Delgamuukw v. British Columbia,114 the Court considered itself bound to follow 
Vancouver College. In the process, it made startling comments to the effect that it 
was no longer possible to assume that all expert witnesses are impartial and 
independent, and held that some are fully participating members of the litigation 
team while others were advocates for the side that employs them. The remedy was 
disclosure of experts’ draft reports to enhance the likelihood of a successful search 
for truth. The Court concluded as follows:
The present law requires an expert witness, who is called to testify at trial, 
to produce all documents which are or have been in his possession, 
including draft reports (even if they come from the file of the solicitor 
with annotations), and other communications which are or may be relevant 
to matters of substance in his evidence or to his credibility unless it would 
be unfair to require production. It is a presumption of law that solicitors’ 
privilege is waived in respect of such matters of substance, etc., when the 
witness is called to give evidence at trial.115
Alberta courts have followed suit. In Hanscom (Litigation Guardian of) v. 
Coyle116 the Master had to determine whether waiver of privilege for an expert’s 
report amounted to an implied waiver of privilege over the expert’s working papers. 
Plaintiffs counsel gave a copy of the expert’s report to counsel for the third party, 
who then requested copies of the doctor’s notes and records on which the report was 
based. The Master decided that voluntary production of an expert report amounted 
to an implied waiver of privilege over the expert’s working papers and ordered 
production of the working papers on this basis.
In Olsen (Stuart) Construction Inc. v. Sawridge Plaza Corp. et a l.ul the Court 
held that although the parties had agreed that the preliminary report of an expert was 
covered by litigation privilege, when it was mentioned on the stand by the expert, 
any privilege protecting it from disclosure was waived.
The Alberta trend on this issue suggests that the courts would order production 
of experts’ working files. Counsel working with experts should therefore be alerted 
to the likelihood of draft reports and working papers being producible upon motion.
113 Vancouver College, supra note 98 at pp. 296-297.
114 Delgamuukw v. British Columbia (1988), 55 D.L.R. (4th) 73 (S.C.).
115 Ibid. at 76.
116 Hanscom (Litigation Guardian of) v. Coyle (1995), 167 A.R. 169 (Q.B.).
1,7 Olsen (Stuart) Construction Inc. v. Sawridge Plaza Corp. et al. (1996), 195 A.R. 94 (Q.B.).
In Ontario, Browne followed the dictum of the Supreme Court of Canada in 
Stone and summarized the applicable principles flowing therefrom as follows:
(a) A report prepared by an expert at the request of counsel for litigation 
purposes is privileged. This would be under the category of litigation 
privilege.
(b) By announcing in an opening jury address the opinion of the expert 
contained in the report, counsel waives the privilege in the content of the 
entire report.
(c) The waiver extends to information in the report, which would otherwise 
be subject to solicitor and client privilege.
(c) Counsel cannot waive privilege in only part of the report.
(e) Once an expert is called as a witness at trial, the opposing party is entitled 
to production of the foundation of the expert’s opinion.
In Stone, the Supreme Court of Canada held that when the accused’s counsel in 
opening address to a jury made reference to an expert’s report, he waived, on behalf 
of the accused, any privilege in the entire report. The Court held that the solicitor 
could not pick and choose what went before the jury.
Browne has been followed in Chapman Management and Consulting Services 
Ltd. v. Kernic Equipment Sales Ltd.,m  where the plaintiff applied for production of 
the working files of the defendant’s expert witness. The Alberta Court of Queen’s 
Bench ordered that the defendant produce all relevant documents in the possession of 
the expert or his firm, including all instructing letters and memoranda from the 
defendant’s lawyer to the expert witness, the expert’s draft reports and primary 
materials from which the expert’s opinions were formed. The issue arose at trial 
during the cross-examination of the expert witness. It would have been helpful if the 
Court explained its reasoning for ordering production as it did, including why it 
ordered the production of all instructing letters from the defendant’s solicitor to the 
expert witness. However, in a very short decision, McIntyre J. simply noted Browne 
and other cases in rendering its order. McIntyre J. also made the following 
comments:
To the extent that Sopinka, Lederman, Bryant, (2d Ed.) (1999), The Law o f  
Evidence in Canada relied upon by the defendant, restricts the plaintiff to 
cross-examination of the expert on the witness stand without examination 
of the expert’s file, I consider this to be too narrow an approach.119
Browne was also followed as indicated earlier in Flinn v. McFarland, in Nova 
Scotia, and in Newfoundland, in Williams v. Thomas Development Corp. 120
118 Chapman Management and Consulting Services Ltd. v. Kernic Equipment Sales Ltd., [2004] AJ. 
No. 756, (Q.B.) McIntyre, J.
119 Ibid. at para. 5.
120 Williams v. Thomas Development Corp. (2003) 233 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 88 (N.L. T.D.).
In Williams, the defendant paving company applied for disclosure of notes 
made by the plaintiff’s expert. The defendant also sought discovery of a videotape 
commissioned by the plaintiff who had relied on an expert report. During the 
examination for discovery of the expert, he testified that he had notes critiquing a 
report prepared by the defendant’s expert in his possession. The plaintiff had not 
objected to any questions referring to the notes, but he argued that they were 
protected by litigation privilege and that in any event, she did not intend to call the 
expert as a witness. The Court ordered production of the notes and commented that 
any privilege regarding them had been impliedly waived by the partial disclosure of 
the notes during the examination for discovery.
If Browne has been well accepted in Canadian case law,121 doubt has recently 
been raised in Conceicao Farms Inc. v. Zeneca Corp. (c.o.b. Zeneca Agro)122 by the 
Court o f Appeal of Ontario.
In Conceicao Farms on 26 July 2006, an Ontario motion judge on appeal dealt 
with a matter where the appellant farmers moved for production of a memorandum 
prepared by Zeneca’s prior counsel in relation to a conversation with an expert
123witness.
Farmers had grown onions and used either Lorsban or Dyfonate pesticides to 
deal with onion maggots. In 1995, they had good results with Lorsban but suffered 
considerable damage using Dyfonate. Zeneca was the manufacturer of Dyfonate. 
Some farmers settled claims with Zeneca, but four chose to bring an action against 
Zeneca. The four farmers claimed that the Dyfonate they used in 1995 was faulty 
and failed to adequately protect their crops from damage by onion maggots.
At the 2004 trial, the farmers claimed that the damage to their crops occurred 
within 31 to 40 days of planting and using Dyfonate. Zeneca claimed a combination 
of earlier than usual planting and later than usual emergence of maggots lessened the 
ability o f Dyfonate to kill the maggots at the crucial time. An expert testified for 
Zeneca, first stating the opinion that Dyfonate controlled maggots for 60 days, then 
changing this to 45 days. During cross-examination, an issue arose as to whether the 
expert had been retained by Zeneca’s prior counsel. The expert could not recall. 
The farmers requested production of the expert’s notes and records. Zeneca’s 
current counsel responded in open court that there was no note showing the expert 
had been retained when he inherited the file in 2000. The farmers did not pursue 
their production request.
121 See: Fisher v. Atack [2004] O.J. No. 5002; Walker, supra note 90; St. Elizabeth Home Society v. 
Hamilton (City) [2004] O.J. No. 1418; Allerex Laboratory Ltd. v. Dey Laboratories L.P. [2003] O.J. 
No. 2909; Hosh (Litigation Guardian of) v. Black [2003] O.J. No. 2374; Aviaco, supra note 110.
122 Conceicao, Ont C.A., supra note 62.
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The farmers’ claims were dismissed in June 2004. The judge stated the action 
was dependent on factual findings regarding whether the loss of the crops were 
damages due to poor quality Dyfonate or environmental factors. The judge noted 
that the expert had supported Zeneca’s position and that the farmers had presented no 
expert evidence to support their position.
The judge concluded unusual or unique environmental factors in 1995 caused 
the maggot damage. In preparing costs submissions, the farmers discovered an entry 
from Zeneca’s prior counsel, in 2000, showing she had retained and had a lengthy 
conversation with the expert. The conversation had been recorded and transcribed 
into a memorandum.
The farmers asked Zeneca to produce the memorandum. Zeneca’s counsel took 
up the matter with the court reporter, claiming he had stated there was a note on the 
file regarding the expert. The court reporter stood behind the transcript, and claimed 
Zeneca’s counsel said there was no note. Zeneca’s counsel refused to produce the 
memorandum, claiming it was privileged and noting it was not requested at trial.
The farmers brought a motion before the trial judge seeking production of the 
expert’s entire file, asking the judge to re-open the trial, strike out the expert’s 
evidence and grant judgment in their favour, or to declare a mistrial. The judge 
dismissed the motion on the basis that he would have come to the same conclusion 
even if he had ignored the expert’s evidence. The farmers appealed both the 
dismissal of their action and the dismissal of their post-trial motion for production.
The Appeal Judge sitting alone, ordered Zeneca to produce the memorandum to 
the farmers within ten days. Because the expert gave evidence in court, his report 
was no longer considered privileged. The memorandum should have been produced 
prior to trial. The Court held it was fair to assume the memorandum contained 
foundational information for the expert’s findings, opinions and conclusions. 
Production was ordered to enable the farmers to determine whether they were denied 
the right to test the expert’s evidence at trial, and to ensure that the Judge’s 
confidence in the expert’s opinion was justified. However, the Court overruled that 
decision as bad law. It held that such request for disclosure was the domain of the 
examination for discovery and that it was inappropriate to allow it after trial. The 
Court also concluded that, at discovery, the memorandum itself was protected from 
compelled disclosure by litigation privilege. However, the content of the 
memorandum could be the appropriate topic o f an examination for discovery in order 
to explore the foundational basis of the expert’s opinion.
The Court noted that Rule 31.06(3) dealt with the disclosure of information, not 
the production of documents. It held that the memo was otherwise privileged by 
litigation privilege and that the rule did not require its disclosure. Having concluded 
that Rule 31.06(3) was unavailable to the plaintiff, the Court observed that it was not 
required to decide the scope of disclosure thereunder. However, it made several 
comments. The Court rejected the principle at one extreme, which would require 
disclosure of all communications between counsel and an expert before preparing a 
report, as this was litigation privilege. However, without limiting the scope of the
disclosure required, the Court held that in addition to the name and address of the 
expert, the rule requires disclosure of the solicitor’s instructions to the expert and the 
facts on which the final opinion is based. The Court finally affirmed that there are 
limits to the disclosure reasonably required to allow a party to test the veracity of the 
opposing party’s expert opinion. The Court’s decision affirms that it is not “open 
season” on the communications between a solicitor and an expert. However, the 
parameters of disclosure remain a source of debate in the lower courts, which 
strongly invites appellant review.124
The other interesting feature in that decision is that although Ontario courts, as 
shown in Bell Canada, had for many years consciously chosen not to follow the 
strict approach of permitting access to the expert’s file, as identified in Vancouver 
College, the Ontario Court of Appeal seems to have overruled Bell Canada and 
turned Ontario procedure in a new direction that is consistent with that in British 
Columbia. Dealings between an expert and counsel and between an expert and a 
party can shape and mould an expert’s opinion. Evidence of those dealings which 
can be found in the expert’s file ought to be producible in court. It is only then that 
the court can assess the soundness and impartiality of the opinion after it has been 
properly tested in a cross-examination that is fuelled by all of the ammunition that 
can be found in the expert’s file. This also covers a memorandum prepared by 
counsel as a result of interaction with the expert if a party is so questioned about at 
the examination for discovery.
The broad approach, one that — in the words of the Supreme Court of Canada in 
Stone -  would enable opposing counsel to have access to the “foundation” of the 
expert’s opinion, requires disclosure of all foundational information for the expert’s 
report, whether or not the final findings, opinions or conclusions expressly reflect 
that information.
The courts in New Brunswick were also attracted by this approach. In O ’Brien 
et al. v. Centre de Location Simplex Ltée et a l.ns the Court took a very liberal 
approach to the issue. One of the issues before the Court was whether a party on 
examination for discovery must disclose any findings, opinions and conclusions of 
experts. The Court quoted with approval from Master Clark in Cheaney v. Peel 
Memorial Hospital126 as follows:
The test is this: if the finding is expressed in a sufficiently coherent 
manner that it can be used by counsel, then it is a ‘finding’ that ought to be 
disclosed. The same applies to ‘opinions’ and ‘conclusions’. They may 
change, and change dramatically, but they still must be disclosed
124 Jay A. Stolberg, “Litigation Privilege vs. Disclosure” Insurance Observer (Winter 2007) online: 
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whenever they are formed. And it is the duty of counsel, as an officer of 
the court, to disclose those coherent ‘findings, opinions and conclusions’ 
as they are disclosed to counsel. It is not proper practice to construct the 
relationship of expert to counsel that no ‘findings, opinions or 
conclusions’ are expressed to counsel until the final written report is 
produced before trial.
The operation of rule 31.06(3) does not depend on the subjective judgment 
of counsel as to whether or not ‘findings, opinions or conclusions’ are 
final or preliminary, or written or oral. Rather, the operation of the rule 
depends on the objective judgment of counsel as to whether his or her 
expert has expressed a coherent ‘finding, opinion or conclusion’ that 
ought, in all fairness, to be disclosed.
If rule 31.06(3) required that ‘findings, opinions and conclusions’ be in 
writing and be final before being disclosed, it would allow counsel to 
avoid all disclosure until forced by rule 53.03(1) to serve a report just 
before trial.127
This test was applied in Pullman Power Products o f Canada Limited v. Noell 
GmbH et a l.m , where the Court ordered that the defendants be entitled to discover 
the findings, opinions and conclusions, whether preliminary or not, pursuant to Rule 
32.06(3) of the Rules o f Court and that they be produced by the plaintiff.
New Brunswick courts have been ambivalent. The most recent trend appears to 
favour a more liberal approach with courts ordering disclosure of all documentation 
that may have been utilized by an expert in making a finding, rendering an opinion or 
reaching a conclusion, whether preliminary or not.
In Marchand v. Public Hospital Society o f Chatham129 the Court made a 
number of significant remarks concerning the practice adopted by many counsel of 
having an expert submit an unsigned draft report that is revised in light of counsel’s 
comments prior to the submission of the final report. The Court indicated that this 
practice might effect the perceptions of the trier of fact regarding the impartiality or 
lack thereof of the expert witness. It is more appropriate to simply ask an expert to 
submit an additional report if counsel thinks that the first report prepared leaves 
certain questions unanswered or unaddressed. By preparing in this manner, each step 
of the expert’s analysis is made available to opposing counsel as a final report and it 
is clear that the opinions it contains are indeed the opinions of the expert and those of 
the retaining counsel. The practice of allowing the expression of an expert’s opinion 
to be modified by the suggestions of counsel leads to the inevitable perception that 
opinions can be purchased.
127 Ibid. at paras. 23-35.
128 Pullman Power Products o f  Canada Limited v. Noell GmbH et al. (1995), 169 N.B.R. (2d) 233 (Q.B.), 
Russell J.
129 Marchand v. Public Hospital Society o f Chatham, [1996] O.J. No. 4420 (Ont. Gen. Div ) affirmed 
(2000), 51 O.R. (3d) 97 (Ont. C.A.).
Canadian courts have gradually expanded production although the extent to 
which draft reports must be produced varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and has 
ebbed and flowed over the years. However, one may say with a fair degree of 
certainty that the emerging trend is towards production of such reports rather than a 
confirmation of privilege. It is therefore fair to suggest that the triumph of candour 
over confidentiality must constantly be minded by practitioners when consulting 
with an expert at any stage of the litigation process.
7. The Lay of the Land: Circa 2007
Third party communication by the solicitor of record is controversial. Is that third 
party an agent of the solicitor so that communications between them attract solicitor- 
client privilege or is it litigation privilege?
In Chrusz, the Ontario Court of Appeal held that protection from disclosure 
of an adjuster’s report would not come through agency but rather through litigation 
privilege. The New Brunswick Court of Appeal concluded otherwise in Lamey. The 
adjuster could be deemed an agent of the client at the direction of the client’s lawyer. 
The file was therefore protected by solicitor-client privilege because of the agent’s 
relationship.
With respect, the view of Doherty, J.A., in Chrusz is preferable by denying 
agency as a tool of obtaining privilege. According to the learned judge:
[120] ... the applicability of client-solicitor privilege to communications 
involving a third party should not be determined by deciding whether Mr.
Bourret is properly described as an agent under the general law of 
agency...the applicability of client-solicitor privilege to third party 
communications in circumstances where the third party cannot be 
described as a channel of communication between the solicitor and client 
should depend on the true nature of the function that the third party was 
retained to perform for the client. If the third party’s retainer extends to a 
function which is essential to the existence or operation of the client- 
solicitor relationship, then the privilege should cover any communications 
which are in furtherance of that fonction and which meet the criteria for 
client-solicitor privilege.
[121] Client-solicitor privilege is designed to facilitate the seeking and 
giving of legal advice. If a client authorizes a third party to direct a 
solicitor to act on behalf of the client, or if the client authorizes the third 
party to seek legal advice from the solicitor on behalf of the client, the 
third party is performing a function which is central to the client-solicitor 
relationship. In such circumstances, the third party should be seen as 
standing in the shoes of the client for the purpose of communications 
referable to those parts of the third party’s retainer.
[122] If the third party is authorized only to gather information from 
outside sources and pass it on to the solicitor so that the solicitor might 
advise the client, or if the third party is retained to act on legal instructions
from the solicitor (presumably given after the client has instructed the 
solicitor), the third party’s function is not essential to the maintenance or 
operation of the client-solicitor relationship and should not be 
protected.130
In setting out this functional approach to applying solicitor-client privilege to 
communications by a third party, Doherty J.A. was speaking on behalf of a 
unanimous Ontario Court of Appeal. A further comment by Doherty J.A., which, is 
entirely applicable to the New Brunswick Court of Appeal decision in Lamey 
highlights the difficulty in the reasoning:
[128] I make one further observation. If the Divisional Court’s view of 
client-solicitor privilege is correct, litigation privilege would become 
virtually redundant because most third party communications would be 
protected by client-solicitor privilege. To so enlarge client-solicitor 
privilege is inconsistent with the broad discovery rights established under 
contemporary pre-trial regimes, which have clearly limited the scope of 
litigation privilege. The effect of that limitation would be all but lost if  
client-solicitor privilege were to be extended to communications with any 
third party who the client chose to anoint as his agent for the purpose of 
communicating with the client’s lawyer.131
There is obvious confusion at the top among various courts of appeal, so much 
so that the uneasiness of Ferguson J. in Browne in calling for appellate review is 
echoed throughout Canada.
The notion of zone of privacy has been acknowledged both in Chrusz and 
Blank (cited above) where the Court of Appeal of Ontario and the Supreme Court of 
Canada recognized that the origin of litigation privilege was different from that of 
solicitor-client privilege. Litigation privilege provides a zone of privacy within 
which a solicitor can prepare for trial without intrusion into his or her thoughts or 
work product. Litigation privilege is not afforded the same deference as solicitor- 
client privilege and it may have to yield to full and timely pre-trial production and 
disclosure.
In the civil context, litigation privilege remains a rule of evidence like many 
other matters of evidence, which regulate the method of conduct of litigation.132 
There is nothing sacrosanct about litigation privilege and indeed, in Chrusz, Carthy 
J.A., noted that the modem day reality is in the direction of complete discovery, 
which has necessarily eroded the extent of litigation privilege. The learned judge 
stated that in effect, litigation privilege is the area of privacy left to a solicitor after 
the current demands for discoverability have been met. Thus, the zone of privacy 
has been diminished in the face of broad disclosure requirements. In fact, this 
attitude is consistent with the modern trend of more expansive discovery and the law
130 Chrusz, supra note 25 at paras. 120-122.
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on that topic in Ontario is in accord with that of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, 
British Columbia and Alberta holding that litigation privilege will only attach if the 
dominant purpose of the third party communication was to assist in possible 
forthcoming litigation.
Of course any privilege can be lost voluntarily or by implication. In Chrusz, 
the Ontario Court of Appeal acknowledged that in some circumstances, litigation 
privilege may be preserved even though the information is shared with a third party, 
provided that there is a common interest in the existing or anticipated litigation.
There is an ongoing debate as to the extent of waiver of litigation privilege for 
documents located in an expert’s file when counsel intends to call that expert as a 
witness at trial. It is readily acknowledged that the facts and documents on which the 
expert relies should be disclosed. The controversy is whether everything else needs 
to be produced such as confidential communications that did not form a basis for the 
expert’s opinion.
As was already noted, limits should be drawn. Some have suggested that the 
facts on which the expert’s opinion is based and the validity of that opinion are 
proper subjects for cross-examination, but that the process by which the opinion was 
developed, the expert’s communications with the client, and the instructions 
provided by the solicitor, should remain subject to litigation privilege. Thus, 
maintaining the privilege over expert’s files to this extent in no way compromises the 
objective of having all relevant information available for trial.
However, the swing towards greater disclosure taken by the Court of Appeal of 
Ontario in Conceicao Farms may have turned Ontario procedure, as noted before, in 
a direction more consistent with that of British Columbia. This is demonstrated in 
the decision of Gillese J.A. Although the case was appealed and overturned on other 
grounds, the Court that heard the appeal did not question or interfere with that 
portion of the judgment on the issue of whether access to expert file contents was 
justified.
As shown in Vancouver College in British Columbia and now in Ontario in 
Conceicao Farms, the logic of these cases will only interfere with dealings between 
counsel and expert, or between party and expert, that alter or shape the expert’s 
opinion substantively.
The court in Browne noted that although the subject documentation in the Stone 
decision was the expert’s report, the implications were broader in that it may open 
the door to requiring production of the entire file of an expert including 
communication with counsel. Simply put, production and disclosure are necessary 
because it is impossible to conclusively determine without just accepting the expert
133 Margaret L. Waddell, “Litigation Privilege and the Expert in the Aftermath of Chrusz” (2001) 20 
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at his word, what was or was not relied on, or influenced the expert, in terms of his 
opinion. Without production, counsel is totally hampered in pursuing this issue. The 
court in Browne held that such full production in accordance with the Ontario Rules 
of Court would be consistent with the more expansive view of discovery as 
propounded in the Chrusz case. Although the Court advocated the complete and full 
disclosure of communications taking place between a counsel and an expert, the 
following conclusion is eloquent testimony of the degree of judicial uncertainty on 
this topic at page 63 in Browne:
This area of the case law cries out for appellate review.
There is much cynicism among the bench and bar concerning the 
objectivity and reliability of experts’ opinions in today’s litigation. I 
believe requiring full production concerning the origins of the opinion 
would deter inappropriate influence on an expert and help restore 
confidence in the process.134
CONCLUSION: A ROOM WITH A VIEW -  WHAT LIES AHEAD
(A) The Future of Canadian Civil Litigation
The law on privilege and disclosure in Canadian civil litigation is in motion. Many 
academic writers have suggested that as a more sensible approach to the use of 
expert witnesses, the enforcement of full and timely disclosure of expert reports and 
limiting the use of experts in the courtrooms would facilitate the fact-finding process. 
This would be compatible with the cardinal principle of liberal interpretation that is 
at the heart of the rules of procedure in Canadian systems of civil justice. This 
principle calls for the just, least expensive and most expeditious determination of 
every proceeding on its merits.
Although there is an unending tension between the competing interests of 
privilege and disclosure, the judicial trend today is leaning in favour of full and 
timely disclosure especially when the materials sought from the expert’s file are 
protected by litigation privilege only.
The adversary system depends on careful and thorough investigation and 
preparation by the parties through their counsel. The adversarial advocate cannot 
prepare without the protection afforded by a zone of privacy. Discovery and 
privilege must strike a delicate balance. Too little disclosure impairs orderly 
preparation. Counsel cannot come to trial prepared without adequate information 
about the case that the opposing side will present. On the other hand, although it can 
be argued that total disclosure would have significant adverse effects on the litigation 
process itself if every thought and observation had to be disclosed, it needs not be so.
The erosion of litigation privilege under the unrelenting pressure of modern-day 
disclosure made reassessment of that privilege necessary by the Supreme Court of
134 Browne, supra note 4 at para. 72.
Canada. The Ontario Court of Appeal, in Chrusz, had laid out two different 
approaches to this privilege. It was also open to the Supreme Court of Canada to 
accept the views in Hodgkinson to include litigation privilege in a single 
comprehensive solicitor-client privilege. This would be the better solution in a 
common law environment where broad relevancy and alternative dispute resolution 
are the engines that drive the fact-finding process.135 In a way, the New Brunswick 
case of Lamey hinted in this direction.
The Court seized the occasion to examine the defining characteristics of 
litigation privilege and its life span. Writing for the majority of the Court, Fish J. 
underlined the distinction between solicitor-client or legal advice privilege and 
litigation privilege. Solicitor-client privilege attaches to and protects confidential 
communications between lawyers and their clients, even outside the litigation 
context. Litigation privilege attaches to information and materials gathered or 
created for the dominant purpose of litigation. Fish J. rejected the Hodgkinson 
approach that treats both types of privilege as two branches of the same tree. Doing 
so would otherwise obscure the true nature of both. While both serve the common 
cause of the secure and effective administration of justice according to law, each 
privilege is driven by different policy considerations and generate different legal 
consequences.
Endorsing the Ontario Court of Appeal in Chrusz, the Supreme Court held that 
the purpose of litigation privilege is to create a “zone of privacy” in relation to 
pending or apprehended litigation. Once litigation has ended, the privilege to which 
it gave rise has lost its specific and concrete purpose -  and therefore its justification.
Thus, the principle “once privileged, always privileged”, which is so vital to the 
solicitor-client privilege, is foreign to litigation privilege. Litigation privilege, unlike 
' solicitor-client privilege, is neither absolute in scope nor permanent in duration.
The Court noted that the object of litigation privilege is to ensure the efficacy of 
the adversarial process; not to promote the solicitor-client relationship. To achieve 
this purpose, parties to litigation, represented or not, must therefore be left to prepare 
their contending positions in private, without adversarial interference and without 
fear of premature disclosure.
While solicitor-client privilege may have evolved over the years into a rule of 
substantive law, litigation privilege, on the other hand, is not directed at (still less, 
restricted to) communications between solicitor and client. It contemplates, as well, 
communications between a solicitor and third parties or, in the case of an 
unrepresented litigant, between the litigant and third parties.
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The privilege may however retain its purpose -  and, therefore, its effect after 
the end o f litigation. The Court agreed with Pelletier J. of the Appeal Division of the 
Federal Court of Canada regarding the possibility of defining litigation more broadly 
than the particular proceeding which gave rise to the claim. As the Court said, the 
litigation is not over until it is over: it cannot be said to have “terminated”, in any 
meaningful sense of that term, where litigants or related parties remain locked in 
what is essentially the same legal combat.
In a watershed moment, the Court also recognized the dominant purpose test. 
Though it provides narrower protection than would a substantial purpose test, the 
dominant purpose standard appears to be consistent with the notion that litigation 
privilege should be viewed as a limited exception to the principle of full disclosure 
and not as an equal partner of the broadly interpreted solicitor-client privilege. Thus, 
the dominant purpose test is more compatible with the contemporary trend favouring 
increased disclosure.
The progressive weakness of litigation privilege was also noted; while solicitor- 
client privilege has been strengthened, reaffirmed and elevated in recent years, 
litigation privilege, on the contrary, has to weather the trend toward mutual and 
reciprocal disclosure, which is the hallmark of the judicial process. In this context, 
the Court held it would be incongruous to reverse that trend and revert to a 
substantial purpose test.
The Court left to another day a related issue: whether litigation privilege 
attaches to documents gathered or copied -  but not created -  for the purpose of 
litigation. After noting that the issue arose in Hodgkinson and resolved in a way 
rejected by the majority of the Ontario Court o f Appeal in Chrusz, the Court opined 
that conflict of appellate opinion on this issue should be left to be resolved in a case 
where it is explicitly raised and fully argued. Extending the privilege to the 
gathering of documents resulting from research or the exercise of skill and 
knowledge does appear to be more consistent with the rationale and purpose of 
litigation privilege. Having said this, the Court issued a caveat by saying that 
assigning such a broad scope to litigation privilege is not intended to automatically 
exempt from disclosure anything that would have been subject to discovery if it had 
not been remitted to counsel or placed in one’s own litigation files nor should it have 
that effect.
To summarize, Blank is of great interest in relation to five specific issues:
(a) It holds that litigation privilege is not a branch or a subset of solicitor- 
client privilege. The Court correctly equates solicitor-client privilege and 
legal advice privilege and keeps it separate from litigation privilege;
(b) The Court clarifies any remaining doubt about what it means to say a 
document was prepared for litigation by upholding the dominant purpose 
test for the document’s preparation. On this specific point, the Court also 
wisely confirms the correctness of lower court decisions extending the 
privilege to self-represented litigants. Unlike legal advice privilege, 
litigation privilege may arise and operate even in the absence of a
solicitor-client relationship; it applies to all litigants, whether or not they 
are represented by counsel;
(c) The Court offered a tentative view on the issue of in-gathered documents: 
documents that are gathered or copied rather than created by a lawyer for 
the purpose of litigation. Although the Court expressly stated that this 
issue should be left to be resolved in a future case, it could not resist 
noting that extending the privilege to the gathering of documents resulting 
from research or the exercise of skill and knowledge does appear to be 
more consistent with the rational and purpose of litigation privilege;
(d) The Court rejected the technical approach to identifying when litigation 
has ended, so as to end litigation privilege. The Court acknowledges that 
closely related proceedings remaining ongoing would preserve the 
privilege thus given it an extended life. The Court referred to this as an 
enlarged definition of litigation, and explained that it includes both 
separate proceedings involving the same or related parties and causes of 
action, and proceedings raising issues common to the initial action and 
sharing its essential purpose. In the words of Fish, J.:
As mentioned earlier, however, the privilege may retain its purpose -
- and, therefore, its effect -  where the litigation that gave rise to the 
privilege has ended, but related litigation remains pending or may 
reasonably be apprehended. In this regard, I agree with Pelletier 
J.A. regarding ‘the possibility of defining ... litigation more broadly 
than the particular proceeding which gave rise to the claim’ ... see 
Ed Miller Sales & Rentals Ltd. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.
At a minimum, it seems to me, this enlarged definition of ‘litigation’ 
includes separate proceedings that involve the same or related 
parties and arise from the same or a related cause of action or 
‘juridical source’. Proceedings that raise issues common to the 
initial action and share its essential purpose would in my view 
qualify as well.136
As noted by Wendy Matheson, one of the solicitors who argued the Blank 
case:
It now remains to be seen how this newly-articulated approach will 
be interpreted in practice. The key issue for future cases will be to 
determine the precise scope of the concept of ‘related litigation’.
It follows that this enlarged definition of “litigation” includes separate 
proceedings that involve the same or related parties and arise from the 
same or a related cause of action (or juridical source). Proceedings that
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raise issues common to the initial action and share its essential purpose 
would qualify as well. The Court held that litigation privilege is not a 
black hole from which evidence of one’s own misconduct can never be 
exposed to the light of day. The extended definition of litigation applies 
no less to the government than to private litigants;
(e) Finally, the Court noted an exception to the availability of the declared 
litigation privilege. It will not protect from disclosure evidence of the 
claimant party’s abuse of process or similar blameworthy conduct. The 
Court offered no authority for this proposition nor did it make it clear how 
broad it intended this exception to be.
In effect, the Court enunciated a general exception to litigation privilege, but in 
doing so, it raised serious questions. Is the standard for looking behind litigation 
privilege blameworthy conduct, abuse of process, misconduct, actionable misconduct 
or some amalgam of these? What will constitute a prima facie showing of such 
misconduct? Would showing such misconduct depend on getting the documents first 
in most cases? This is an unfortunate weakening of the judgement and an invitation 
to make allegations of abuse of process or misconduct by litigants in circumstances 
where the real objective is simply to try to obtain disclosure from inside the opposing 
lawyer’s office. Adopting this approach to its fullest extent could represent a 
significant and unwarranted expansion of the existing exception to solicitor-client 
privilege. A further extension of the exception to exclude communications in 
furtherance of a malicious prosecution or abuse of process would be more defensible 
given that these claims go to the very heart of the administration of justice.138
Blank also made it clear that there is overlap. Much of a litigation file is 
covered by solicitor-client privilege and should be protected indefinitely, regardless 
of whether litigation privilege over the file has come to an end:
[49] ...In practice, a lawyer’s brief normally includes materials covered by 
the solicitor-client privilege because of their evident connection to legal 
advice sought or given in the course of, or in relation to, the originating 
proceedings. The distinction between the solicitor-client privilege and the 
litigation privilege does not preclude their potential overlap in a litigation 
context.
[50] Commensurate with its importance, the solicitor-client privilege has 
over the years been broadly interpreted by this Court. In that light, 
anything in a litigation file that falls within the solicitor-client privilege 
will remain clearly and forever privileged.139
This could have been the end of the discussion on litigation privilege but for the 
dissenting decision of Bastarache J. who, while concurring in the result, issued 
different reasons that echoed Hodgkinson in the nature of litigation privilege.
138 Dale E. Ives, supra note 136.
139 Blank, supra note 11 at paras. 49-50.
According to Bastarache J., in 1983, litigation privilege was merely viewed as a 
branch of solicitor-client privilege. This means that Parliament most likely intended 
to include litigation privilege within the ambit of “solicitor-client privilege”. It 
follows that a two-branch approach to solicitor-client privilege should subsist, even 
accepting that solicitor-client privilege and litigation privilege have distinct 
rationales.
At an overarching level, litigation privilege and solicitor-client privilege share a 
common purpose: they both serve the goal of the effective administration of justice. 
Litigation privilege does so by ensuring privacy to litigants against their opponents 
in preparing their cases for trial, while solicitor-client privilege does so by ensuring 
that individuals have the professional assistance required to interact effectively with 
the legal system.
For Bastarache J., reading litigation privilege into section 23 of the Federal 
Access to Information Act was the better approach because litigation privilege had 
always been considered a branch of solicitor-client privilege. In the end, Bastarache 
J. agreed with Fish J. that the Minister’s claim of litigation privilege had failed 
because the privilege had expired.
The blameworthy conduct general exception to litigation privilege has quickly 
generated litigation. In Smith v. London Life Insurance Company140 the plaintiff had 
sued the insurer in an earlier action seeking reinstatement of disability insurance 
benefits. While that action was being settled in favour of the plaintiff, the plaintiff 
brought another lawsuit against the insurer alleging breach of duty of good faith in 
terminating insurance benefits. The insurer defended the second action alleging in 
its pleading that its employees had acted in good faith.
The second action in Smith brought to the forefront the notion of blameworthy 
conduct and related litigation. In reversing an order made by a superior court justice 
directing the defendant, London Life, to produce its entire claims file arising from a 
prior action between the parties, including documents authored by its in-house 
counsel and other employees. The court discussed the difference between solicitor- 
client privilege and litigation privilege, as well as the circumstances in which 
documents subject to the latter will be ordered to be produced.
In the end, the Court ordered London Life to produce a more detailed affidavit 
of documents, listing each document with respect to which privilege was claimed. In 
addition, the Court virtually invited the plaintiff to bring a further motion to have a 
court review the documents to determine whether their production should be ordered 
because of blameworthy conduct on part of the insurer.
140 Smith v. London Life Insurance Company (2007) CanLII 745 (ON.S.C.D.C.).
Smith does not make clear just what has to be shown before a litigant can ask 
the court to inspect all of the opposing party’s privileged documents to see if any of 
them should be ordered to be produced, despite being protected by litigation 
privilege. The Court noted, relying on Blank, that litigation privilege that arises in 
the context of earlier litigation continues to protect the documents in the second 
action where the subject matter was closely related to the facts in the first action. It 
also cited Blank in support of the proposition that documents protected by solicitor- 
client privilege, which had been earlier ordered to be produced on the basis of waiver 
of privilege, will remain clearly and forever privileged. The Court noted that the 
simple fact of pleading that the insurer had acted in good faith did not constitute a 
waiver of privilege.
The Court, however, returned to the Blank case to suggest that in some 
circumstances, litigation privilege would not protect a party’s document and thus 
issued the order referred to above. Unfortunately, the Court did not articulate what 
evidence would suffice as a prima facie showing of actionable misconduct, nor did it 
explain just what it meant by actionable misconduct in relation to the proceedings. 
However, the Court noted that such prima facie showing of actionable misconduct 
was something more that a mere allegation in the pleading.141
(B) The Twilight of litigation Privilege?
The intimate relation between solicitor-client privilege and litigation privilege has 
been highlighted both in Three Rivers and Blank.
In Three Rivers, Lord Scott of Foscote said, when discussing the issue of what 
is known in England as the legal-advice privilege, otherwise known as solicitor- 
client privilege, that it is impossible to express a cornering view about the issues 
debated in that appeal without taking into account the policy reasons that lead to 
legal-advice privilege becoming established in Common Law in the first place and 
for its retention in the law today. The law Lord then set out to review some of the 
features of legal advice privilege in order to provide a context for the policy reasons 
underlying the privilege. In the course of his discussion, he alluded to the 
relationship between legal-advice privilege and litigation privilege in the following 
way:
Legal advice privilege has an undoubted relationship with litigation 
privilege. Legal advice is frequently sought or given in connection with 
current or contemplated litigation. But it may equally well be sought or 
given in circumstances and for purposes that have nothing to do with 
litigation. If it is sought or given in connection with litigation, then the
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advice would fall into both of the two categories. But it is long settled that 
a connection with litigation is not a necessary condition for privilege to be 
attracted... On the other hand it has been held that litigation privilege can 
extend to communications between a lawyer or the lawyer’s client and a 
third party or to any document brought into existence for the dominant 
purpose of being used in litigation. The connection between legal advice 
sought or given and the affording of privilege to the communication has 
thereby been cut.142
Alluding to the substantial changes in the civil procedure rules of England and 
the fact that nowadays, litigation has taken a decidedly non-adversarial attitude, the 
law Lord made the following comments, which may well, one day, impact on the 
assessment of litigation privilege in Canada:
This House in in re L [1997] AC 16 restricted litigation privilege to 
communications or documents with the requisite connection to adversarial 
proceedings. Civil litigation conducted pursuant to the current Civil 
Procedure Rules is in many respects no longer adversarial. The decision 
in in re L warrants, in my opinion, a new look at the justification for 
litigation privilege. But that is for another day...143
The ultimate outcome of raging judicial debate on this topic will determine the 
magnitude of the zone of privacy protected by litigation privilege or if that privilege 
is still relevant. At issue is the effectiveness o f our systems of civil litigation. Policy 
considerations in this context should be dictated by concerns of due process. But 
“that is f o r  another d a y ”.
142 Three Rivers, supra note 14 at para. 27.
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